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ABSTRACT 
Militarism in pre-World War IF    Japan was a product of Japan's culture, 
manifested within its distinctive internal domestic institutions, stimulated by 
the encroaching external pressures, and is distinct from militarism anywhere 
else in the world. 
The culture of Japan emphasized the group over the individual, a strong 
sense of hierarchy, and a profound pride in the divine nature of the national 
essence.  The abrupt intrusion of the technologically advanced Western 
civilization triggered an "insider-outsider" mentality within Japan that rejected 
participation in the Western diplomatic, and economic cabals which denied 
Japan its true equal (or, to some, superior) position in the community of 
nations.  Japan's pre-war militarism clearly can be defined as the mobilization 
of the entire society, drawing upon an essentially homogeneous outlook, to 
achieve a position within the international system which reflected the cultural 
perception of Japan's "chosen" status (derived from centuries of Shinto 
influence) within the family of man.  The martial segments within Japanese 
society used the "alien" international system, largely defined at the time in 
Imperial-colonial-military terms, to buttress the martial segments within 
Japanese society and to justify the expansion of their influence. 
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What is militarism, and how has it taken a specific 
meaning when applied to Japan?  Contemporary attempts at 
deriving a universal definition of militarism have been less 
than precise, yielding products which, although attractive 
in a broad theoretical setting, are unable to explain the 
varying historical manifestations of militarism in the 
different regions of the world.  The failure to arrive at a 
useful understanding of militarism, in Japan, Germany, or 
anywhere else, lies in a misbegotten assumption of 
conceptual universality. 
Concepts such as freedom, democracy, war, and even 
militarism differ in meaning from one ethnic or geographical 
region to the next.  This suggests that a useful definition 
of the concept of Japanese militarism must be derived from 
the impact of culture and history within the distinctive 
Japanese context.  Only by beginning at the beginning can 
one expect to interpret the meaning behind Japan's past 
actions, or to project a reasonable hypothesis of its future 
endeavors. 
Beginning with the clan-uji-units that existed before 
recorded history on the Japanese islands, a number of themes 
emerged which have guided Japanese thought to the present 
day.  The most recognizable effect of the clan period was 
the development of the extended Japanese national family. 
Just as each individual in sixth century Japan knew his or 
her position in the complex, family-based, hierarchical 
structure that comprised the clan, so to did each Japanese 
in the third decade of this century recognize and 
acknowledge his or her position in the extended hierarchical 
structure of the Imperial state. 
The notion of the extended "Japanese" national family 
was strengthened by the continuing influence of Japan's 
native religion, Shinto.  Within the doctrines of Shinto all 
Japanese are descendants of a group of primal deities who 
created the Japanese islands thousands of years before.  As 
ix 
the living descendants of Amaterasu, the preeminent, life 
giving sun goddess, the Yamato clan established itself as 
the rulers and high priests of the islands.  Nearly a 
millennium and a half later the clan's leader, Emperor 
Hirohito, reigned during World War Two as a reminder of the 
Yamato race's divine origin, and as a father figure for the 
greatly extended modern Japanese family. 
Other religions and philosophies also left their mark 
upon militarism's development.  Confucianism provided 
structure to the irregular, chaotic proceedings of the early 
Japanese court.  Later, the spread of Buddhism to the 
Japanese islands, with its emphasis on ceremony, distracted 
the Imperial court and allowed the military Shogunates to 
gain predominance.  Seeking to advance their own interests, 
the military governments at Kamakura, Kyoto, and later Edo 
promoted the influence of Zen amongst the military class.  A 
hybrid of Chinese Confucianism and Buddhism, Zen evolved in 
Japan to incorporate and reflect the nation's own native 
Shinto beliefs.  This emerging philosophy contributed in its 
own way to the Bushido Code, which held little regard for 
life, valuing instead a stable social order, personal honor, 
loyalty, and sacrifice in the name of duty to one's 
superior. 
The revolutionary fervor of the Meiji Restoration in the 
nineteenth century destroyed many of the ineffectual social 
and governmental structures of Japan's feudal era, replacing 
them with efficient Western models which had been formed in 
the foundry's of the industrial revolution.  Ancient court 
councils and bloated military bureaucracies were replaced by 
parliamentary cabinets, traditional clothing disappeared, 
samurai no longer wore their swords, and a new conscription 
army protected the young government.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century Japanese militarism had become, by all 
outward appearances, like its counterparts in the West, but, 
despite its Western facade, in its heart it remained 
x 
Japanese.  Nowhere was this fact more evident than in the 
Imperial Army. 
The leaders of the imperial Army were more than willing 
to adapt superior Western uniforms, weapons, and tactics to 
their cause, and they were open to the advantages of an 
conscription army in the age of total mobilization, but they 
were also intent on maintaining the elemental Japanese 
characteristics of their organization and culture.  Orders 
flowed within a chain of command shaped not by liberal 
notions of individual equality, but by the strict social 
regulation of Asian Confucianism.  Military leaders 
preserved the traditional dual nature of the Japanese 
government by subjugating the military, within the framework 
of the Meiji constitution, directly to the Emperor as 
opposed to the parliamentary cabinet.  In the end, the 
conscription army served as a conduit for the transmission 
of the Bushido Code of the samurai to the entire breadth and 
width of the nation, profoundly impacting its development. 
A perceived threat to the divine "national essence" of 
the Japanese state arrived with the international system 
which had so rudely awakened Japan from its long sleep of 
isolation in 1854.  Imposing the treaty condition of 
extraterritoriality upon the less advanced Japanese, Western 
powers unwittingly bruised the fierce pride of the "divine" 
Yamato race.  While the cries of "revere the Emperor-expel 
the barbarians" soon faded, replaced by "revere the Emperor- 
strengthen the nation," the Japanese never forgot the 
humiliation of the unequal treaties and worked constantly to 
gain acknowledgement of Japanese equality.  Treaty revision 
coincided with the Japan's first large scale military 
venture onto the Asian mainland, but many of the advances'of 
that successful campaign were subsequently lost in 
diplomatic bargaining after the guns fell silent.  Japan 
entered the twentieth century convinced of the unfair nature 
of Western diplomacy, and that international respect came 
only through aggression, the possession of land, and power. 
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Hence, by the commencement of hostilities on the Asian 
continent in the nineteen thirties, Japan's military had 
established a preeminent and leading role in Japanese 
society.  Cultural traditions established over centuries of 
feudal rule aided the militarists as they preserved their 
predominant role, first established in 1185, in the 
formulation of national policy, independent of the civil 
government.  Japanese society, coopted and indoctrinated by 
the conscription army and its auxiliary representatives in 
the rural villages, came to support the militarists in their 
effort to establish "National Unity."  Careful cultivation 
of the Shinto cult encouraged the populace to accept the 
military as true leaders of the nation, representing the 
pure characteristics of Japanese culture. 
Hence, Japanese militarism, as a political phenomenon, 
had at its base a purely Japanese, cultural foundation, and 
as such is distinct other occurrences of militarism in the 
world.  In a very real sense Japan's pre-war militarism can 
be defined as the mobilization of the entire society, 
drawing upon the essentially homogeneous nature of that 
society, to achieve a position within the international 
system which reflected the cultural perception of Japan's 
"chosen" status (derived from centuries of Shinto influence) 
within the family of man.  That the "alien" international 
system was largely defined at the time in Imperial-colonial- 
military terms only served to buttress the martial segments 
within Japanese society in justifying the expansion of their 
influence. 
What does this conclusion imply for Japan? Clearly it 
suggests that Japanese "militarism," rooted in the very 
"Japaneseness" of that society, could not be destroyed 
simply by taking away the nation's military capabilities. 
Although the cultural aspiration to acquire recognition of 
Japan's "chosen" position as a leader within the 
international system met with disaster during World War Two, 
the cultural belief in Japan's "chosen" status survived. 
xxi 
Alternative venues, distinct from military power, offered 
Japan the opportunity to rebuild, exercise influence, and to 
gain recognition of its leadership. 
Japan has learned its lesson militarily.  It now 
realizes the inherent vulnerabilities of a nation isolated 
on the edge of the massive Asian continent, lacking even the 
most rudimentary raw materials to fuel its economy. 
However, as its culture develops under the momentum of its 
own dynamism as well as its continued exposure to external 
ideas, Japan will likely continue to follow the Emperor's 
command to, "work with resolution so as ye may enhance the 
innate glory of the Imperial State" by pursuing the 
establishment of its "chosen" position within the family of 
man through economic and diplomatic means. 
Xlll 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At 0 856 on 2 September 1945 the Japanese delegation 
arrived at the starboard gangway of the battleship Missouri, 
the site chosen by the Allied powers for the surrender of 
the Imperial Japanese government and the ending of World war 
Two.  The climb up the ladder to the main deck was difficult 
for the leader of the delegation, Foreign Minister Mamoru 
Shigemitsu, who had lost a leg in an assassination attempt 
years before.  He was followed by a delegation composed of 
ten Japanese military officers and dignitaries.1 
Beneath the glaring eyes of a thousand enemies the 
Japanese were brusquely shown where to stand and wait for 
the ceremonies to begin.  A band struck up the Star Spangled 
Banner as General Douglas MacArthur appeared, accompanied by 
Admirals Nimitz and Halsey.  Ponderously, solemnly, the 
victorious General began to speak; "We are gathered here, 
representatives of the major warring powers, to conclude a 
solemn agreement whereby peace may be restored."2 
As the historic event unfolded, one of the members of 
the Japanese delegation, Toshikazu Kase, found his eyes 
uncontrollably drawn to the rows of small Japanese flags 
painted on the bulkhead of the Missouri, each representing a 
Japanese ship, submarine, or plane.  He wrote later, 
I could hardly bear the sight.  Heroes of 
unwritten stories, these were the boys who defied 
death gaily and gallantly...They were like cherry 
blossoms, emblems of our national character, 
swiftly blooming into riotous beauty and falling 
just as quickly.3 
At 0925 the surrender proceedings ended, but for the 
^orison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval 
Operations in World War II. Volume XIV: Victory in the Pacific. 
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1960) pp. 363-365. 
2MacArthur, Douglas, Reminiscences. (New York:McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1964) p. 275. 
3Kase, Toshikazu, Journey to the Missouri,   (New Haven, 1950) 
p. 13. 
Japanese the process of rebuilding their nation was just 
beginning.  Abject in defeat, hungry, many without homes, 
and spiritually drained, many Japanese wondered, "How did we 
arrive at this dismal point?" As more information became 
available, a growing sense of betrayal arose.  The nation's 
despondence focused on the militarist leaders, not for 
losing the war, but for leading Japan into the war against 
such overwhelming odds.4 
In the search for a scapegoat, few questioned how the 
militarists came to lead the country, who had supported 
them, and what were the sources of their power.  These are 
questions that I will explore.  My hypothesis is that the 
"militaristic" movement in Japan that brought about its 
entry into World War II was an expression of Japan's 
cultural evolution. 
At the root of this hypothesis is my belief that there 
were certain unique factors which encouraged the 
manifestation of Japanese militarism in the early half of 
this century.  Looking beneath the superficial, surface 
manifestations of Japanese militarism, my focus will be on 
the evolution of Japan's national culture, and its influence 
upon the mass public, the constitutional civil government, 
and the "professional" military.  It can reasonably be 
assumed that Japan's prewar militarism was a representation 
of a national character unique to itself and distinct from 
similar developments of militarism in other nation-states. 
This description can be tested by examining: 
1. How did Japan's civil society view the 
civil/military relationship? 
2. How did Japan's military view the civil/military 
relationship? 
3. How did the military characterize its role within 
society? 
"Reischauer, Edwin 0., The Japanese. (Cambridge, MA:The 
Belknap Press, 1977) p. 104. 
4. How did the civil society characterize the 
military's role in society? 
5. What was the military's view of its position in the 
of governing of Japan? 
6. What was civil society's view of the military's 
position in the governing of Japan? 
7. Against the background of the previous questions, 
how did Japan view its role in the world community? 
The answers to these questions will determine whether 
Japan's pre-World War II militarist period was indeed a last 
lingering historical affect of feudal culture.  On the basis 
of these findings, a future examination can be made to 
determine if, in post-World War II Japan, the acceptance of 
the democratic process by the general population of Japan 
and the establishment of strong civilian control of the 
military forces by the government could allow Japan to 
pursue a security policy comparable to the policies of 
Western nations without presenting a threatening presence in 
the Asian Pacific region. 

II.  DEFINITIONS AND DILEMMA 
A.  MILITARISM DEFINED 
What is militarism, and how has it taken a specific 
meaning when applied to Japan?  It is not simply the 
opposite of pacifism, nor is it merely the control of a 
nation by military leaders.  These definitions lack 
completeness in that they fail to encompass the societal 
basis of militarism or the state policies that it generates. 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines militarism 
as,"..the prevalence of military sentiment and ideals among 
a people,"5 while the Encyclopedia Americana defines it as 
"..policy giving exceptional emphasis to military 
preparedness" and "..relying on force in international 
relations."6 Taken together these definitions describe a 
society which thinks highly of the military, spends money to 
equip that military, and then is not above using it to 
influence others in the world.  These definitions still lack 
precision.  Without any other qualifying standards, many 
nations in the modern era, from Nazi Germany to the United 
States today, could be classified as militaristic.  At least 
in the case of the United States, this is just not true. 
A precise definition of Japanese militarism must 
encompass the whole spectrum of its society, from its 
philosophy to its diplomacy.  Such a definition for the 
German state was attempted by the historian Alfred Vagts in 
his masterpiece on the subject of militarism.  He identifies 
it as, 
...the unquestioning embrace of military values, 
ethos, principles, attitudes; as ranking military 
institutions and considerations above all others 
in the state; as finding the heroic predominantly 
in military service and action, including war--to 
the preparation of which the nation's main 
5The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 1973) p. 1323. 
6The Encyclopedia Americana. Vol. 19, (New York: 1968) p. 
59. 
interest and resources must be dedicated, with the 
inevitability and goodness of war always presumed. 
Such high regard leads to the advocacy of applying 
military values, organization--notably 
hierarchical features--to the totality of a 
nation's life.7 
B.  THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARISM 
Vagts derived his definition from the German experience 
in the Western European environment of the latter 
nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries.  Within this 
backdrop, militarism is not the antithesis of pacifism (the 
love of peace).  Instead, Vagts suggests that militarism 
should be regarded as the antonym of civilianism, a concept 
which promotes the supremacy of the individual's rights over 
the needs of the government, and lacks application in Asian 
cultures which place priority on the group rather than the 
individual.  Additionally, even within the Western context 
this definition leaves room for dissension when attempting 
to categorize nations as militaristic. 
Marxist writers in the first half of the twentieth 
century ascribed militaristic tendencies to the United 
States and other nations of Western Europe, alleging a 
capitalist-militarist cabal against the masses.9 Western 
analysts in recent years have used militaristic terms to 
describe the activities of the government of Turkey, which 
has a dynamic military elite which occupies a very strong 
role within a government known for its liberal institutions. 
Western historians have described both Nazi Germany and 
pre-World War II Japan as militaristic, yet in both of these 
cases the role of the military, government, and individual 
interests differed.  In Germany, for example, an 
authoritarian political party used militaristic procedures 
to carry out an aggressive genocidal war utilizing a highly 
7Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism. (New York: Meridian 
Books Inc., 1959) p. 453. 
8Liebknecht, Karl, Militarism. (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 
1917). 
subordinate military force, but in Japan militarism reached 
its peak as a dynamic military overcame the growing 
liberalizing influence of the political parties to implement 
an authoritarian government bent on military, Imperial 
aggression.9 Ultimately all of these examples represent a 
form of militarism; depending upon one's perspective. 
Aside from the attempts to label the United States as 
militaristic, which ignore its liberal democratic government 
and its strongly subordinated military, valid arguments have 
justified the application of militaristic labels. 
Differences between Japanese, German, and Turkish models can 
be found in the peculiar outlook of their peoples and the 
differing roles and importance assigned to the individual, 
the military, and the government in each case.  These 
diverging views have little to do with the external force of 
the international system.  Instead they spring from each 
nation's history and cultural development. 
Few ideas are totally universal.  Concepts such as 
freedom, democracy, war, and even militarism differ in 
meaning from one ethnic or geographical region to the next. 
This suggests that a useful definition of the concept of 
Japanese militarism must be derived from the impact of 
culture and history within the distinctive Japanese 
context.10 
C.  THE DILEMMA OF JAPANESE MILITARISM 
Only by viewing a concept's development in its totality 
can we expect to arrive at a true understanding of its 
nature.  The dilemma of differing interpretations of 
fundamental concepts arise from differences in culture, 
history, and national expectations.  For example, a 
researcher investigating the nature of the U.S. foreign 
Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State, 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957) pp. 98-139. 
10Ruggie, John G., "Continuity and Transformation in the 
World Polity," in Keohane, Robert 0., (edt.) Neorealism And Its 
Critics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) p. 152. 
policy of 1914 would be hard pressed to understand the 
reasoning behind the neo-isolationist statements of Wilson 
and Bryan, unless he had accompanying knowledge of the 
Puritan ethic, the foreign policies of Washington and 
Jefferson, and the mercantilist economic policies of the 
United states in the 19th century. 
A study of Japan's militaristic policy must build upon 
this approach.  Only by beginning at the beginning can one 
expect to interpret the meaning behind Japan's actions. 
Accordingly, I shall begin with an investigation of the 
historical roots and development of the Japanese state in an 
attempt to ascertain the basic cultural traits which formed 
the "lenses" of Japan's view of the world.  Next will be a 
study of Japan's emergence from isolation and the impact of 
Western ideas on Japan's core beliefs, followed by an 
analysis of the policies and actions of Japan's leaders 
during the decisive decade of the nineteen-thirties. 
Finally, I shall analyze the events surrounding Japan's 
decision to surrender in 1945, deriving a new definition of 
Japanese militarism and the implications of that definition 
to Japan and the world. 
III.  THE ORIGINS OF THE STATE 
What is the spirit of Yamato's ancient land? 
It is like the wild cherry blossoms, 
Radiant in the rising sun.11 
The cherry blossom which blooms so brightly and so 
briefly has become a symbol to the Japanese nation.  In the 
spring millions of trees bloom throughout the Japanese 
islands, and the nation leaves the workplace to walk, laugh, 
sit, and stare at the multitude of blossoms before they 
fall.  Japan's militarist leaders likened the cherry blossom 
to the warrior, who could only expect a short life in which 
to bloom, to dazzle, and then, in a sweep of the wind, 
disappear.  To understand the blossom, one must examine the 
tree, its limbs, the trunk, the seed, and the soil from 
which it sprang.  So it is with nations.  Nations derive 
their character from the events that influence their growth. 
The fundamental properties of Japanese militarism lie in the 
Japaneseness of that militarism. 
This opening chapter examines the early historical 
evolution of the Japanese state to determine the soil, seed, 
roots, and trunk of its national character.  This 
examination of the basic clan, or uji  units that have 
existed in Japan since the beginning of recorded history 
reveal the Chinese influence on Japanese society and the 
subsequent development of feudal hierarchy and bureaucracy 
which formed the properties necessary to produce Japan's 
distinctive outlook on the world. 
A.  CLAN CULTURE 
The origins of the Japanese people are shrouded in 
mystery.  Displaying physical characteristics of Asian, 
Polynesian, and Caucasian peoples, the inhabitants of the 
Japanese islands appear to have emigrated from different 
regions and arrived on the islands in waves, bringing new 
influences to the island's societal development with each 
"Morris, Ivan, The Nobility of Failure. (New York: The Noonday 
Press, 1975) p. 290. 
new migration.12 The diverse collection of peoples and 
languages produced a system of rival clans whose entire 
populace would take up arms while fighting for land and 
supremacy, thus developing a pervasive martial spirit. 
Constant competition resulted in the growth of some clans 
through the absorption of their competition either through 
marriage or conquest.  Unpacified, aboriginal tribes, such 
as the Ainu and the Kumaso, were pushed to the northeast and 
southwest respectively, isolated from the evolving central 
state, consigned to a destiny of segregation or 
extinction.13 
Warring competition forced the clans to develop 
autonomous supporting structures.  Trade guilds developed to 
supply the necessary weapons, tools, and cookware for 
everyday life.  Prisoners became slaves, serving the victors 
until time, new enemies, and romance brought about their 
incorporation into the clan.  Generations of warfare 
produced a semblance of civil order on the central plain of 
Honshu in the form of the powerful Yamato clan, the 
progenitor of the modern Imperial family, the supreme clan 
among equals.  However, while the Yamato Emperor-chief did 
exercise direct control over his own clan, his control over 
other clans was indirect, through their own chiefs (uji no 
kami)   who, like the Emperor, were hereditary leaders.14 
Shinto, a native religion that developed with the clan 
society, supported this loose confederation.  As in many 
early cultures, the early Japanese clans perceived gods 
(kami)   and magic in the world around them.  Rocks, 
12Smith,  Robert J.,  and Beardsley,  Richard K.,  Japanese 
Culture: Its Development and Characteristics.  (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Co., 1962) pp. 3-10. 
"Sansom, G. B., Japan. A Short Cultural History. (New York: 
Appleton-Century Croffs, 1962) pp. 25-28. 
14Brown, Delmer M., "Introduction," The Cambridge History of 
Japan, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 
18-20. 
10 
waterfalls, the sun, and the moon were all supernatural 
beings to be worshiped.  Clans, influenced by their 
surroundings, worshiped different kami.  Clans which drew 
their sustenance from the sea worshipped the kami of the 
sea, while agricultural clans honored the kami who 
influenced the growth of crops.  Clan chiefs identified 
themselves as the descendants of these kami, thus linking 
themselves more closely with nature and granting themselves 
the prestige of a divine origin.15 Hence competition 
between the clans became a competition between the kami that 
the clans worshiped, played out on a supernatural stage. 
Defeats in battle were explained by the differences in the 
strength of the individual kami. 
The ascendancy of the power of the Yamato clan during 
the early centuries of the first millennium confirmed the 
Yamato ancestor-kami, Amaterasu, the sun goddess, as the 
chief kami within the Shinto hierarchy.  Clans of influence, 
such as the Nakatomi and the Imibe court families, traced 
their descent from the gods associated with the sun-goddess 
in mythology.  Not missing the importance of Shinto in 
legitimizing the position of the Yamato clan, the Emperors, 
in their role as the high priests of the sun-goddess cult, 
carefully shaped and molded the myths of the island state to 
support the Yamato's claim to supremacy among the clans of 
the island.16 
The seeds of Japanese militarism can be found in the 
earliest customs of the clan period (Circa 50 B.C.-552 
A.D.).  Warring clans which engaged their entire populace in 
the competition for land encouraged the growth of the 
martial spirit needed to sustain a weak central government. 
Lacking a credible external enemy, this confederation sought 
lsDuus, Peter, Feudalism in Japan. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., 1976) p. 17. 
16Noss, David S., and Noss, Jon B.,  A History Of the World's 
Religions. (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1990), pp. 325-326. 
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to unite the national polity under the leadership of the 
high priest of the Yamato clan by recognizing him as the 
spiritual leader of the Japanese state.  Early Japanese 
patriotism became synonymous with the Shinto belief that 
Japan was a divine land of the gods, and its people, due to 
their divine descent, were "chosen" or unique because of 
this.17 The weak government would grow stronger, but the 
belief in the divine nature of Japan served as a central 
rallying point for militaristic forces throughout Japan's 
history. 
B.  CHINESE CULTURAL INFLUENCES 
China's influence in the development of Japan had been 
ongoing affair, but the journals of a Buddhist missionary 
from Korea, who arrived in Japan in 552 AD, presents the 
first clear documentation of this process.18 Buddhism, over 
the next thousand years, would become the vehicle for the 
transmission of knowledge and culture from China to Japan, 
but even the transmission of this peaceful religion could 
not avoid contributing to militarism's development.  During 
the sixth century Buddhist factions in the Japanese court 
repeatedly attempted to introduce the new faith at court 
only to be blocked by Shinto traditionalists.  In 587 AD the 
leader of the Soga clan, Soga no Umako, asked the dying 
Emperor Yomei to allow Buddhist ceremonies at court.  The 
Emperor, hoping that the new god would prolong his life, 
assented.  In a pitched battle following the Emperor's death 
blood flowed in the streets of the capital as rival clan 
struggled for power.  Buddhism, a philosophy of peace, 
gained its permanent place in Japanese society through the 
17Kitabatake, Chikafusa, A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns, 
Varley, H. Paul, trans., (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1980) p. 50. 
18Reischauer, Edwin 0., The Japanese Today. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988) p. 18. 
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defeat of the traditional Shinto factions in battle.19 
Remembering the legitimizing features of the Shinto 
religion, the Emperors quietly continued to carry out the 
ceremonial rites of Shinto along with the new Buddhist 
practices.  This is the first clear demonstration of the 
Japanese propensity to adapt new philosophies while 
maintaining what is essential to their core identity. 
Another trait of Japanese power politics was began when 
Soga no Umako married members of his family into the royal 
line.  In 592 AD his young niece, the Empress Suiko, was 
enthroned and the half-Soga Prince Mumayado no Toyotomimi 
was named Regent.20 This Regent is remembered in history by 
another name: Shotoku. 
There is, aside from the mythical, founding Emperor 
Jimmu, no other within Japan's history who occupies such an 
exalted place in the nation's memory as Shotoku.  Legend 
recounts that his birth was miraculous in nature, occurring 
spontaneously as his mother visited the Imperial stables. 
Even as a baby he could speak as an adult, and his wisdom 
was such that, "he could attend the suits of ten men at once 
and decide them all without error."21 It was also alleged 
within his lifetime that he could predict future events, but 
his chief contribution to the state is reflected in his 
court title; Toyotomimi-Master King of the Law.22 
The conflicts between clans, so common during this 
period of weak central authority, served to remind Shotoku 
that his family's high position in the Imperial court stood 
19Nihonai. Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A.D. 
697, translated by W.G. Aston (Rutland, VT: Charles E. TuttleCo., 
1972) pp. 110-115. 
20Varley/ H. Paul, "Early Japan," An introduction to Japanese 
Civilization. Tiedemann, Arthur E., Edt., (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974) pp. 22-23. 
21Nihonai. p. 122. 
22Ibid. p. 108. 
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upon shaky ground.  Perhaps due to this instability, 
Shotoku's studies of Chinese culture concentrated primarily 
on the philosophies of governing.  Attempting to stabilize 
societal structure, he issued an edict in 604 AD which has 
been recorded as the Shotoku constitution.  It is ironic 
that Shotoku, whose family had championed the Buddhist 
religion in the Imperial court, would establish a central 
government for Japan based upon Confucian principles. 
Confucianism, a philosophy first espoused in the 
teachings of the Taoist scholar-bureauc.rat Confucius (551- 
479 BC), promotes the Tao goal of harmony through the strict 
observance of social, hierarchical relationships and the 
pursuit of virtue.  The Confucian relationships were between 
the parent and the child, the older brother and the younger, 
between the husband and the wife, between the old and the 
young, and between the ruler and the subject.23 Confucian 
relationships were based upon the ethic of reciprocity; the 
loyalty of the child, younger brother, wife, younger person, 
or subject must be returned through consideration of their 
needs. 
A clear product of Confucianism, the Shotoku seventeen 
article constitution codified the supremacy of the Emperor 
(Article III), the importance of hierarchy (Article IV) , and 
the right of the central government to govern (Article 
XII) .24 However, while the five relationships remained 
common to each culture, differences developed in 
interpretation and application.  In China the relationship 
between the subject and the ruler allows for the disavowal 
of the ruler if he should lack virtue.  In Japan the divine 
nature of the Emperor, as a descendent of the sun goddess, 
made his actions virtuous by definition; revolt against his 
23Noss, p 326. 
24De Bary, Wm. Theodore, Keene, Donald, and Tsunoda, Ryusaku, 
Sources of Japanese Tradition Vol.  I.  (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1958), pp. 48-51. 
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Imperial wishes was unthinkable.  A thousand years later the 
virtuous nature of the Imperial will would be perverted to 
justify Japanese expansion onto the Asian continent. 
Forgetting this tenet, the Soga family in the early 
decades of the seventh century began to invest themselves 
with Imperial prerogatives.  Their greedy grab for power 
paved the way for the return of the Soga rivals, the 
Nakatomi clan (minus its anti-Buddhist rhetoric) to the 
center of influence, eliminating the Soga as a power at the 
Imperial court.  The half-Soga Empress .Kogyoku abdicated.25 
Her successor, Prince Naka no Ohoye, was a charismatic 
young man.  Brave, he was a warrior in the traditional 
sense, leading Japanese armies to victory in Korea, 
intelligent, he built a device that tracked the hours of the 
day through the flow of water between buckets, and great 
"cloud chariots" which could be used to look over the walls 
of enemy installations.26 Although he naturally attracted 
people to his cause, his humility kept others in the court 
from suspecting that he harbored any personal ambitions for 
the throne. 
The elevation of the young Prince to power in 662 AD 
heralded a marked centralization of power in the Imperial 
court.  Assisted by his friend and councilor Nakatomi no 
Kamatari, the Emperor Tenchi (Heavenly Intelligence) 
continued the Shotoku consolidation of power in a central 
government by issuing a series of reform edicts that became 
known as the Taika (Great Change) reforms.27 These reforms 
sought to gain control of the outlying areas through a 
system of provincial deputies answerable to the central 
government.  Carried out over a fifty-year period, reform 
abolished the great, untaxable, land holdings, and 
25Kitabatake, pp. 130-135 
26Ibid, p. 264-265. 
27Sansom, Japan. A Short Cultural History, pp. 94-96, 
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implemented a uniform system of taxes that weakened the 
power of the clans.  In the background, Japan's first 
permanent capital in Nara, built along the lines of the 
great Chinese capital Xian, came into being.  Due to health 
considerations, the capital moved twice more before settling 
in Heian (the original name of Kyoto) in 784, where the 
Imperial court of Japan would reign until 1867.28 
For his roles in the overthrow of the Soga clan and the 
reform of the central government, Nakatomi no Kamatari 
received a new surname, Fujiwara, a name that exerted great 
influence in Japan during the next four centuries.29 Taking 
a lesson from the Soga clan, the Fujiwara family cemented 
their supremacy within the court by marrying their daughters 
into the Imperial family, enthroning young Emperors, and 
acting as Regents.  In a parallel development, the civil 
government was dominated by ministers who happened to bear 
the Fujiwara name, firmly establishing the proclivity of 
Japanese to operate from "behind the curtain."30 The years 
of Fujiwara dominance established the precedent of dual 
government in which the Emperor reigned while others ruled, 
leaving the Imperial institution open for manipulation in 
the centuries that followed.  However, it appears that at no 
time did the members of the Fujiwara family contemplate 
usurping the Imperial line and claiming the throne for 
themselves.  By the ninth century, the divine origin of the 
Emperor had reached a point of universal acceptance. 
The Fujiwara period (857-1160) was characterized by the 
decline of the central government.  The land reforms of the 
Shotoku and Taika periods were overtaken by the growth of 
large, tax-free estates in the outlying provinces.  By the 
tenth century the national tax paying domain disappeared, • 
29Murdoch, James, A History of Japan. Vol. I,  (New York: 
Fredrick Ungear Publishing Co., 1964) pp. 207-208. 
"Nihongi, p. 291. 
30Kitabatake, p. 166. 
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financially strangling the developing central government. 
The leaders of the government, strapped for money, decided 
that they had learned all there was to learn from the 
Chinese, ended the costly diplomatic and cultural exchanges 
with the continent.  A hereditary aristocracy that enjoyed 
the rising material wealth of tax-free estates while 
contributing little to the authority of the court replaced 
the Confucian ideal of a bureaucratic hierarchy based on 
merit.31 
Confucianism had supplied the stabilizing attributes of 
regularity and hierarchy to Japanese society, providing a 
philosophical support to the rough social order of the clan 
period.  Consolidation of power in a powerful central 
government provided an opportunity to move Japanese society 
forward together, but the moment of Imperial effectiveness 
was brief.  Chinese influence, receding like a tide, gave 
way to the diffuse interests of the small aristocratic 
groups, remnants of the great uji clans of the past, that 
surrounded the Imperial family.  Japanese society had 
evolved under the influences of outside culture, but in its 
heart it remembered and maintained what is essentially 
Japanese. 
C.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE SAMURAI 
As cultural borrowing from China ended, Buddhism, which 
was in decline in India and China, began to expand in Japan. 
However, just as with other aspects of cultural borrowing, 
the Japanese altered Buddhist principles so that it might 
more closely match Japanese traditions.  Magical prayers, 
elaborate ceremonies, and the proliferation of art 
characterized the period, at the expense of philosophical 
content.  Appreciation of harmony, which was common to 
Shinto, Confucianism, and Buddhism became central in 
Japanese culture, and expressed itself in the ceremonies, 
31Fairbank, John K., and Reischauer, Edwin 0., East Asia. The 
Great Tradition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960) pp. 504- 
509. 
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art, and deliberations of the Japanese ruling court.32 
While the court weakened, nobles diligently pursued the 
development of their estates in the outlying provinces.  The 
organization of these estates began to resemble the uji- 
clans of the pre-Nara period.  The influence of Chinese 
ancestor worship and notions of filial piety began to have 
an effect at the provincial level, reinforcing the cohesion 
between local leaders and followers.33 Loyalty to the 
immediate superior or military protector took priority over 
loyalties to the Emperor or to the clan.  The family based 
social structure gave way to a new hierarchy built upon the 
needs of the estate.  Cultivators, who harvested and 
produced the goods of the estate, provided the base.  Next 
came the estate büke,   or constable-foremen, and their 
families, who managed and protected the land.  Aristocratic 
owners, and their immediate subordinates occupied the 
peak.34 This structure provided strong, regionally based 
groups with the ability to pursue goals of economic and 
political independence. .Increasingly absent owners, heavily 
involved in the court's ceremonial culture, neglected their 
responsibilities in the home provinces.  Rising incidents of 
crime in the wake of declining central authority increased 
local reliance on the büke families, and encouraged the 
growth of a warrior class as the estates raised armies to 
protect themselves.  Combined, these two trends contributed 
to a growing separation between the local martial elite and 
the absent cultural aristocracy in Kyoto. 
As the competition for land and revenues increased, the 
importance of the absent aristocratic-owners diminished, 
leaving the büke families, now the heart of a warrior class, 
to vie with each other for supremacy in the power vacuum • 
32/ Grousset, Rene', The Civilizations of the East: Japan. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941) pp. 114-115. 
33 
34 
Sansom, Japan. A Short Cultural History, p. 208. 
lDuus, pp. 33-35. 
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that characterized the final days of the Fujiwara period. 
Feudalism, organized along military lines for the purpose of 
territorial conquest, defined the reality of Japanese life. 
The rise of feudalism climaxed in the conflict between 
the Minamoto and Taira Houses (also known in Chinese 
characters as the Genji and Heike).  Both Houses descended 
from the Imperial line, the Minamoto traced their beginnings 
to the Emperor Saga in 814 AD, while the Taira House was 
created thirty years later by the Emperor Kammu for his 
grandson.35 Each House held large land holdings on the rich 
central island of Honshu, and each was sought an opportunity 
to increase its wealth and power through political maneuver, 
or, if need be, through armed conflict.  Emperor Toba's 
death in 1156 AD left open the question of Imperial 
succession, providing the catalyst for the war between the 
two Houses, and ultimately gave rise to the nation's first 
true militarist, Minamoto Yoritomo. 
Yoritomo, as the eventual victor of the Gempei Wars, 
occupies a place as one of the greatest figures in Japanese 
history, and yet he is little understood, a character of 
seeming endless contradictions.  His exploits as a military 
leader were the stuff of legends, his failings as a man have 
supplied Japanese playwrights with tragic material for 
generations.  A revolutionary who irreversibly altered the 
structure of government rule in Japan before his death at 
age 52, Yoritomo's accomplishments were the products of 
cold, calculated planning, organization, and a social 
movement which imbued the nation with a harsh sense of 
military order.     As a leader he coveted the loyalty of his 
subordinates, but as a man his suspicious nature drove him 
to kill his own followers, including two brothers, for fear 
that they would steal his power.  A superb general known for 
his bravery in battle, Yoritomo often cowered outside of his 
own capital after a sexual dalliance rather than face the 
35MurdOCh, p. 236, 252. 
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jealous wrath of his wife.  Ambitious for power, in a world 
where power was embodied in the Imperial court, Yoritomo 
ultimately established his center in a military camp two 
hundred miles from the Emperor's court in Kyoto. 
In 1180 AD, after a generation of losses to the Taira 
House, Minamoto Yoritomo led his armies down from the 
mountains to defeat his enemies in battle after battle, 
including the pitched sea battle of Dan-no-ura which claimed 
the life of the young Taira Emperor as well as the Sacred 
Sword, one of the three divine treasures.  In 1185, seeking 
revenge for the deaths of his father and two older brothers 
a generation before, Minamoto Yoritomo defeated the final 
remnants of the Taira House and coldly ordered the deaths of 
any survivors.36 
Minamoto Yoritomo sought to avoid the intrigues of the 
Imperial court that his predecessors had fallen into by 
maintaining his power base at Kamakura, in the Kanto region, 
allowing the Fujiwara family to continue its control of the 
court, while he controlled the nation.  In 1192 AD as the 
leader of an organized dual government, Yoritomo accepted 
from the Emperor the title "Seii-Tai-Shogun,"   (barbarian- 
subduing-generalissimo) and became the recognized military 
governor of Japan.37 It would be under the title of 
"Shogun" that he, and the succeeding military dictators of 
Japan would rule. 
The military government at Kamakura represented the 
first truly effective central government in Japanese 
history.  The central committee of the high command (a 
feudal "Joint Chiefs"), whose jurisdiction ranged in scope 
from law to commerce, relied on consensus, issuing only 
unanimous decisions.  The promulgation of the Joei  Code 
36Mass, Jeffrey P., "The Kamakura bakufu," The Cambridge 
History of Japan, Vol. Ill, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1993) p. 58. 
37Sansom, Sir George B., A History of Japan to 1334, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958) p. 331. 
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{Joei  was the reign name in place at the time) in 1232 AD 
(originally issued as a House law for the Minamoto family) 
provided a legitimizing basis for the martial, hierarchical, 
social structure that came to dominate Kamakura Japan. 
Diverging from the hierarchy envisioned by Chinese Confucian 
scholars, the Joei  code firmly established the military as 
the ruling class in Japan.38 
The military nature of Yoritomo's climb to prominence 
had a profound effect upon the development of Japan.  Art, 
theater, and poetry during the Kamakura period (1185-1333) 
all celebrated the warrior or samurai   (one who serves) as 
they were known in the Kamakura capital.  Even religion, in 
the form of Zen, began to change.  The new religious outlook 
placed only fleeting value on one's own existence, instead 
service to one's liege lord was the ultimate purpose in 
life.  Moving beyond law, tradition began to define a 
special place for the warrior within Japanese society. 
The code of these warriors was simple, if not harsh and 
reflected values that stretched back to the uji. 
The warrior does not ask favors from his lord. 
He counts upon leadership and protection, but he 
makes no conditions about rewards.  The 
relationship between the two parties subsists upon 
loyalty alone.  The warrior does not question the 
commands of his lord, but obeys them regardless of 
his own life, his family, and all his private 
interests.  In defeat he must bear in mind what he 
owes for past favours and must be ready to die in 
the cause of his lord, or in the cause of the 
family or clan of which he is a member.  It 
follows that a warriors life belongs to his 
lord...39 
The same type of soldier would appear again in Japanese 
history, in the sky over enemy ships, just prior to diving 
upon them in the hope of exchanging their life for the lives 
of hundreds of the enemy. 
38Duus, p. 57. 
39Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334, p. 360 
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At the grass-roots level, the Kamakura government 
organized the state by installing a samurai-representative 
in each of the outlying provinces.  Charged with policing 
the provinces and protecting the populace from the marauding 
thieves which frequented the countryside, these "stewards" 
funded their activities by collecting taxes in the form of 
agricultural products, mostly rice; designating a small 
portion going to the central government in Kamakura.  This 
system of taxes revolutionized government in Japan by 
destroying the tax-free estate, and uniting the nation under 
the Kamakura banner, albeit reluctantly in some cases. 
When Yoritomo died in 1199 AD, he was succeeded by his 
sons, both of whom were weak rulers.  All but extinct by 
1226, the Minamoto family brought from Kyoto a member of the 
Fujiwara family and adopted him into the Minamoto House. 
True power in Japan resided with the family of Yoritomo's 
wife, the Hojo, who had sheltered him in their home province 
of Izu during the years of Taira control.40 At the 
beginning of the thirteenth century, in perhaps the greatest 
display of behind-the-curtain duality, we find an Emperor, 
controlled by a court, which is being controlled by a 
Minamoto (Fujiwara) Shogun, who is in turn being controlled 
by a Hojo Regent.  Control from behind the scenes had become 
the accepted norm in Japanese politics, and that control 
rested largely on the power of and loyalty to the sword of 
the samurai. 
The Kamakura government continued for nearly a century 
and a half after the death of Minamoto Yoritomo, before 
falling under the weight of internal and external events. 
The character of the Kamakura government in its early stages 
mirrored a simple and austere military camp.41 
Unfortunately, later generations did not possess such 
characteristics.  The fading of the Minamoto line brought 
""Murdoch, pp. 428-429. 
41Sansom, Japan. A Short Cultural History, p. 304 
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the Fujiwara family to Kamakura.  While the Hojo and their 
subordinates continued to rule from behind the puppet 
Shoguns, the Fujiwara-Minamotos began to practice and 
promote ritual ceremonies imitating those held at the Kyoto 
court.  Samurai, previously employed as military 
subordinates a generation before, became bored during the 
period of peace, and began to turn to artistic and political 
pursuits.42 The decline of key military virtues handicapped 
the Kamakura government during the crises of the thirteenth 
century. 
The failure of the Mongol invasions of 1274 and 1281 AD 
can be attributed not to the military prowess of the 
Japanese, but to freak storms which drove the invader's 
ships to sea where many of them were destroyed.  The 
Kamakura government, struggling to prepare the country for 
the two invasions, and subsequent ones that never came, 
bankrupted itself.  Weakened, it was unable to deal with the 
internal unrest that arose from militant religious groups, 
who gained influence in the provinces by claiming credit for 
summoning the decisive kamikaze   (divine winds) which had 
destroyed the invasion, demonstrating the continued 
influence of the native Shinto cult in Japanese thinking. 
The Imperial court in Kyoto, remembering days of direct 
Imperial rule, began to agitate against Kamakura authority, 
while other feudal leaders, forgetting the bonds of loyalty 
that had tied them to the Kamakura government in the past, 
began to consider a new hierarchy in Japan.43 
These forces came together in 1331 behind the leadership 
of retired Emperor Go-Daigo II, who formed a coalition 
between the militant monks and disaffected daimyo, and 
marched against Kamakura.  To quell this revolt the 
42Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334. pp. 420-422. 
43Varley, H. Paul, "Cultural Life in Medieval Japan," The 
Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. Ill, Yamamura, Kozo, Edt., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 455-457. 
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Shogunate dispatched their own forces under the leadership 
of General Ashikaga Takauji, who promptly switched sides 
upon meeting the ex-Emperor's banner.  In 1333, their forces 
destroyed, the Hojo regent, and two hundred members of his 
family and staff, committed ritual suicide rather than face 
capture.44 Already the particular zealous quality of 
Japanese militarism, which recognized more achievement in 
dying by one's own hand than living to fight again, was 
becoming evident. 
Go-Daigo II ruled Japan for only a ghort time.  Within a 
few years, Ashikaga Takauji secured the Shogun commission 
from the Emperor and transferred power to his capital 
outside Kyoto.  However, his area of influence never 
extended far beyond the provinces of central Japan.45 For 
the next two hundred years the social structure of Japan 
continued its feudal development without the benefit of 
central leadership.  Militarism, however, did remain, 
incubating in the ripe environment of provincial 
competition. 
The Confucian based feudal code, which experienced 
cycles of ascendancy and decline since the days of Shotoku, 
did not break under the strain of the anarchy that prevailed 
throughout Japan.  Instead it contracted to the confines of 
the feudal fiefdorn, family and other small groups.  The 
Ashikaga period saw Zen philosophy, a skillful blending of 
the Confucian hierarchy and Buddhist mysticism, support and 
strengthen the hold of the martial spirit on Japanese 
culture.  Stressing rigid conventions, an avoidance of all 
excesses in life, and the continuity of life and death, 
Japanese Zen came to celebrate the martial spirit of the 
"Kitabatake, pp. 245-246. 
45Hane, Mikiso, Japan. A Historical Survey. (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1972) pp. 105-107. 
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governing military class.46 
Spiritually strengthened, but lacking a central 
controlling authority, the regional powers pursued their 
ambitions through increasingly organized warfare. 
Militaristic tendencies extended beyond the bushi   (warrior) 
class to the entire population, escalating the level of 
civil strife.  The small, estate domains disappeared, 
swallowed up by the large feudal domains which, unlike the 
national government which lacked a hierarchical apex, were 
complete in their feudal structure.  The daimyo  (great name) 
feudal leaders, intent on making their domains independent 
from outside resources, encouraged the production of goods 
and materials locally, signaling the growth of the trade and 
merchant classes which, previously, had been restrained by 
feudal forces.47 
The Kamakura period stands as a turning point in 
Japanese history.  The weakness of the Imperial civil 
government led to its decline as an effective ruling power. 
Into this vacuum stepped military clans who, building upon 
historical customs that stretched back to a time before the 
Yamato established their dominance on the Honshu plain, set 
themselves against each other for the control of the state. 
Order was established, ostensibly to protect the Imperial 
institution, by a military class which created hierarchical 
lines of social authority.  Art, poetry, and custom 
celebrated the virtues of the military camp.  For the next 
eight hundred years militarist thought would dominate 
Japan's culture. 
46ln his book, A Book of Five Rings. (New York: The Overlook 
Press, 1974) the 16th century swordmaster Miyamoto Musashi pays 
tribute to Shinto, Buddhist, Confucian, and Zen beliefs within the 
first two sentences of the first paragraph. 
47Ratti, Oscar, and Westbrook, Adele, Secrets of the Samurai, 
(Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Comp., 1973) pp. 62-72. 
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D.  UNIFICATION 
The Ashikaga period (1333-1573), largely characterized 
by civil unrest and dissolution, served to prepare Japan for 
the period of strict, hierarchical, feudal rule that lay 
ahead of it, but first the country had to be unified.  The 
burden of this task fell upon the shoulders of three men who 
changed Japanese history through the power of the sword. 
Oda Nobunaga, at the turning point of his life, was the 
ruler three provinces around the modern town of Nagoya, east 
of Kyoto.  Beginning with one province bequeathed to him by 
his father, he captured the others in minor skirmishes early 
in his career.  In 1568 AD, on the pretext of supporting a 
rival candidate in a succession dispute for the Ashikaga 
Shogunate, Oda invaded and captured Kyoto.  The new Ashikaga 
Shogun, was soon displaced from power.  in twelve years, 
after defeating the militant monasteries in the central 
region of Japan, Oda Nobunaga consolidated his control over 
central Japan.  Assassinated in 1582 by a treacherous 
vassal, his dream of attaining complete dominance over Japan 
unfulfilled, Nobunaga left an heir, a five year old 
grandson, under the protection of a four-man council, 
composed of his most trusted assistants.48 
Hideyoshi, a commoner who did not even rate a surname, 
had risen through the ranks to become Oda's ablest general. 
Soon after the death of his leader, Hideyoshi displaced 
Oda's heir by coopting the other members of the protective 
council.  Hideyoshi, however, honored Oda's memory by 
continuing his dream of unifying Japan under central rule. 
This was accomplished through successive campaigns to the 
southwest, where in 1587 theShimazu realm was defeated, and 
the north, where in 1590 the Hojo family in the Kanto 
surrendered.  Soon, all the remaining daimyo, awed by 
Hideyoshi's success, flocked to his standard, completing the 
3Fairbank and Reischauer, pp. 584-585 
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political unification of Japan.49 
Hideyoshi established his capital at Osaka where he 
built a great castle, and established a system of government 
based upon feudal vassalage.  Major tasks undertaken during 
his rule included an attempt to curb the destabilizing 
Christian influence, which had arrived with Portuguese 
explorers in 1549, and the invasion of Korea in 1592 and 
again in 1597.50 These invasions were the result of 
Hideyoshi's ambitious desire for further conquest (he had 
plans for moving the Japanese Imperial court to Peking after 
he had conquered China),51 and his recognition of the need 
to keep his large, armed, military force occupied while he 
cemented his power base in Japan.  Both invasions failed, 
and, in 1598, Hideyoshi died leaving another five year old 
heir (his son) under the protection of another council of 
regents.52 
Hideyoshi*s bid to establish his descendants as the de 
facto rulers of Japan suffered the same fate as Oda's.  In 
1600 Tokugawa Ieyasu, a confident and ally of Oda Nobunaga 
and a member of Hideyoshi's council of regents, defeated 
rival daimyo in the Battle of Sekigahara, and seized control 
of the country.  in 1603 the Emperor "invited" Tokugawa 
Ieyasu to assume the Shogun title that had adorned the 
Minamoto and Ashikaga Houses earlier in Japan's history, 
immediately concerned with insuring the short term survival 
of his regime, Tokugawa established his capital far from the 
court in Edo, and strenuously restricted contact with the 
court to avoid the intrigues of the Kyoto court which had 
brought down previous Shogunates.  Recognizing that the 
49Duus, pp. 88-89. 
50Boxer, C. R., The Christian Century in Japan. 1549-1650, (Los 
Angeles: university of California Press, 1951) p. 45-47. 
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failure of the Nobunaga and Hideyoshi governments to 
continue themselves lay in the succession of weak leaders, 
unable to defend themselves, leyasu resigned the Shogunate 
in 1605 in favor of his steady and reliable third son 
Hidetada.  leyasu gave up the title, but not the power, 
continuing to rule in fact from his castle at Sumpa while 
his son carried out the visible duties of the Shogun in the 
new military capital at Edo.53 
Hideyoshi's young son Hideyori, whose safety in Osaka 
castle had been guaranteed in the Sekigahara surrender 
agreement, continued to be a threat to the Tokugawa 
government as a potential rallying point for opponents.  In 
1614, after careful preparation, the young heir was 
maneuvered into declaring war upon the Tokugawa.  Such was 
the degree of Tokugawa's preparation that not one major 
daimyo came to Hideyori's aid.  In 1615 Osaka castle fell, 
insuring the short term survival of the Tokugawa regime.54 
The longevity of the Tokugawa Shogunate, which lasted 
from 1600 to 1867, can be attributed to the care taken in 
establishing a stable social-political structure based upon 
the power of the Shogun as the "servant" of the Emperor, 
leyasu realized early that the position of a non productive 
warrior class atop the social hierarchy must be justified 
philosophically to the people.  Buddhism, with its emphasis 
on ritual, and art was largely regarded with disdain by the 
military class and the increasingly sophisticated 
townspeople.  Instead, the philosophical foundation for the 
Tokugawa period would come from the rationalism of Confucian 
thought. 
Confucianism's focus on the creation and maintenance of 
social order based on an ethical fit Tokugawa's needs. 
"Hall, John Whitney, "The bakuhan system," The Cambridge 
History of Japan. Vol. IV, Hall, J. W., Edt., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) pp. 145-146. 
S4Sansom, Sir George B., A History of Japan. 1334-1615, 
(Stanford: Stanford University press, 1961) pp. 396-398. 
28 
Confucian ideas of hierarchy justified the rigid social 
cleavage that characterized Japanese society in the 
seventeenth century.  Ieyasu formalized this structure in 
his edict, Laws of the Military Houses, delineating a 
society headed up by an Emperor, protected by a Samurai 
class, which included the members of the central government, 
the subordinate daimyo, and all of their armed retainers, 
supported by a peasant class, regarded as the primary 
producers, a artisan class, with their craft making 
abilities, and, finally, a merchant class, whose usefulness 
to society was in question.55 
The structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate had at its heart 
the House council of the Tokugawa family, but grew to 
reflect the bureaucratic government ideal of Confucian 
teaching.  The Shogun was advised in his decisions by a 
group of eight to eleven senior shimpan   (kinsmen) or fudai 
(friendly daimyo).  National administrative matters of a 
routine nature were considered by the Roju   (Council of 
Elders) composed of three to six senior Tokugawa kinsmen. 
Those administrative offices concerned with services for the 
Shogun and his retainers were handled by the Wakadoshiyori 
(Council of Junior Elders).  Early administrative agencies 
of the early Tokugawa regime developed into a complex 
bureaucratic apparatus focused on a policy of maintaining 
the power and prestige of the military class in Japan, hence 
insuring the long term survival of the government.56 
One of the initial actions taken by the government along 
these lines was to curtail the influence of Western ideas in 
Japan.  Judging Christianity to be a destabilizing element 
in Japan's social order, Hideyoshi had ordered the 
missionaries out of Japan, but they returned with the 
trading ships that frequented the Japanese ports.  Upon 
gaining power, Tokugawa Ieyasu initially reversed 
"Fairbank, and Reischauer, pp. 602-604. 
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Hideyoshi's policy, hoping to increase Japan's wealth 
through trade with the priest's home countries, but the 
discovery of a Christian backed plot against the Tokugawa 
rule in 1606 changed his opinion of the possibility of 
profitable relations.  The Edo government, over the period 
of eight years, issued a series of anti-Christian edicts, 
ordering the deportation of foreign missionaries along with 
prominent Japanese converts.  Following leyasu's death in 
1616, his successors, Hidetada and lemitsu, moved vigorously 
to restrict European trade to one port, Nagasaki, in an 
attempt to stem their growing influence.  A revolt near 
Nagasaki in 1637 of Japanese Christians against the harsh 
restrictions of the Tokugawa government led to the massacre 
of 20,000 Japanese and the expulsion of all Spanish and 
Portuguese from Japan.  By 1641 all trade was limited to the 
island of Deshima, in Nagasaki harbor, where only Dutch 
merchants were allowed to land.57 An edict issued after the 
Christian revolt forbid all Japanese citizens to travel 
abroad on the pain of death.  Japan entered a period of 
nearly complete isolation from the rest of the world. 
The culture that developed during this period of 
isolation was largely governed by the five relationships of 
Confucianism, and by the Confucian concept of social virtue. 
Through comparison it becomes apparent that the idealized 
virtues of Japan are distinct from those honored in China. 
Whereas in China the sedate virtues of benevolence, justice, 
ceremony, knowledge, and faith were extolled, the more 
militant Japanese chose to honor loyalty, ceremony, bravery, 
faith and frugality as the ideals of their society.  The 
ethical standards derived from these virtues, were distinct 
from the ethics of China.  In feudal Japan loyalty to a 
superior, and to the social unit took clear priority over 
loyalty to one's family.  Confucian morality, within the 
hierarchical system of Japan, demanded a greater emphasis 
57 Boxer, pp. 315, 330-331, 377-389. 
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upon conformity, and, as a result, created a greater social 
pressure upon the individual.  Individuals came to be 
governed by the concepts of griri (duty) and on   (a debt of 
gratitude to a superior for his benevolence), developing a 
strong sense of discipline which was essential if the 
individual was to fulfill his often sacrificial role in the 
increasingly martial society.  Lacking the Western concept 
of guilt from sin, the Japanese sense of duty to his "unit," 
as expressed within the feudal hierarchy, provided the 
controlling element of shame, should that duty go 
unfulfilled.58 
Many factors aided the spread of these concepts.  The 
decision to isolate Japan allowed the Japanese culture to 
develop in what modern historians have termed a "hothouse" 
free of competing ideas.  The increased study of history by 
scholars, an essential part of Confucian thought, began to 
rediscover the ancient role of the Emperors, both as the 
actual rulers of Japan and as the divinely descended heads 
of the Shinto cult.  Hayashi Razon, the Confucian advisor to 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, wrote the General History Of Our State, 
which focused in part on the divine origins of the Japanese 
Imperial family, the Japanese islands, and the Japanese 
people as expressed in the Shinto myths." The works of 
Hayashi and other writers served to reinvigorate the 
feelings of uniqueness among the Japanese people.  Already 
in isolation, the concept of the Japanese as a chosen 
people, descended from gods, living on islands created by 
the gods, served to create and justify an isolationist, 
ethnocentric viewpoint of the world.60 
The establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the 17th 
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century marked 1000 years of political and cultural 
development in Japan.  Superficially, Japanese society 
strongly resembled other contemporary societies.  They 
possessed cities, states, and a central government that 
resembled many Western nations.  They held notions of law, 
freedom, and liberty.  They valued the family, tradition, 
and order like other property based societies, but when one 
examined the status of the individual in society, Japan and 
the West began to part ways. 
In the development of the Western nation-state, the 
individual emerged as the base unit of society.  In Japan 
the forces of history and culture emphasized the importance 
of the group.  Beginning with the uji period, individuals 
depended upon the other members of their clan for mutual 
defense against opposing groups.  The individual's survival 
and very identity became intertwined with his group 
affiliation.  The uji culture beget the proto-feudal estates 
of the Kamakura period where, again, the individual's 
identity was bound to the estate which supported him. The 
isolation of the Tokugawa period strengthened this 
characteristic with its emphasis upon loyalty to a military 
superior, further fostering the growth of group identity 
within a highly regimented social system.  Ruling military 
elites, cultural descendants of the warring uji clan chiefs, 
established order, and provided the stabilizing backbone of 
the developing state.  Cultural acceptance of military rule 
was such that when one daimyo died, many followers, whose 
whole existence had been linked to his destiny, chose to 
follow him in death rather than continue in this life.61 
The most celebrated example of this cultural trait is the 
tale of the Forty Seven Ronin. 
Ronin were displaced or discredited samurai who lacked 
the patronage of a lord.  In the case of the Forty Seven 
"Tesshi, Furukawa, "The Individual in Japanese Ethics," The 
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Ronin, their liege lord had been forced to commit ceremonial 
suicide after he had wounded an official of the Shogunate 
who had been taunting him.  His loyal subordinates fostered 
a plan to take revenge upon the official.  Faking 
drunkenness to disguise their intentions, they executed a 
night raid upon the official's compound.  Taking the head of 
their target, they surrendered to the local magistrates, 
who, with great honor, allowed them to take their own 
lives.62 
Japanese culture also placed emphasis on hierarchical 
relationships within society.  From the time of the Shinto 
hierarchy of kami  that emerged from uji competition, the 
Japanese possessed a well-defined sense of hierarchy.  The 
impact of Chinese borrowing upon the Shotoku Constitution 
served to encourage the growth of this principle.  Tokugawa 
leyasu's, Laws of Military Houses, strictly applied during 
the isolation period, cemented hierarchy into Japanese 
behavioral patterns.  Every individual's place within the 
family, the village, the army, and the state was set and 
reenforced on a daily basis as a means of maintaining order, 
discipline, and political stability.63 
The final characteristic of Japan's feudal society was 
its exclusivity.  Indoctrinated from birth with the tenets 
of Shinto which describe the Japanese as a chosen people, 
the average citizen of Japan looked out upon the world in 
us-them terms.  Driven by fear, or arrogance, Japan made a 
conscious decision in the seventeenth century to reject the 
influences of the West and embrace their own unique, 
"special" culture.  The long isolation of the Tokugawa 
period and the subsequent expansion of the nationalist- 
Confucian philosophy encouraged the growth of this 
"Turnball, Stephen Samurai Warlords (New York: Sterling 
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ethnocentric view by casting the rest of the world in 
threatening terms.64 
These characteristics, all products of Japan's history, 
provide the foundations for the government of Tokugawa 
leyasu and his descendants.  These same characteristics 
survived Japan's later transition from a feudal society to a 
modern society, and contributed to the rise of militarism in 
Japan during the nineteen thirties and forties.  Within the 
hot house of isolation, the cherry tree of militarism grew 
and matured.  With the warm winds of spring, the tree bursts 
forth in blossom. 
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CHAPTER IV. PRELUDE TO MILITARISM 
Today in flower, 
Tomorrow scattered by the wind- 
Such is our blossom life. 
How can we think its fragrance lasts forever?65 
A.  INTERNAL REVOLUTION 
That the Tokugawa Shogunate survived for over two 
hundred years was due to the vision and foresight of its 
founder, Tokugawa leyasu in creating a social system which 
acted to preserve the status quo of the early seventeenth 
century, and curtailed contact with the outside world, 
negating those influences which might threaten his power and 
influence in Japan.  Daimyo who had supported Tokugawa 
during his rise to power (collectively known as the fudai) 
received the rich and prosperous provinces surrounding the 
military capital at Edo, shielding the capital from possible 
attack.  Those daimyo who had opposed Tokugawa (known as the 
tozama  or "outside" lords), were relegated to fiefs in the 
periphery of the Japanese islands, far from the military 
center at Edo, and from the Imperial court at Kyoto.66 
Time, as in most cases, corrupted those in power.  The 
bakufu administration, expanding by leaps and bounds, 
created new bureaucratic agencies with each passing year. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Shogunate 
faced a series of major crisis.67 Samurai, occupied with 
administrative duties, ceremonies, and rising personal debt, 
became increasingly unable to carry out their prime duty, 
maintaining order within the country.68 However, the 
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inherent stability of the Tokugawa system of government 
probably would have allowed it to survive for perhaps 
another hundred years had it not been for the pressures of 
Western influence. 
The West had first arrived in Japan during the sixteenth 
century with the Portuguese traders, but were expelled from 
the islands by the early Tokugawa Shoguns.  Trade with the 
Dutch (restricted to a tiny island depot in Nagasaki 
harbor), China and Korea continued, providing Japan with 
news of the slow European expansion to their north (the 
Russians in Siberia), and to the south (the English in 
China).69 Russia had made an unsuccessful attempt to open 
Japan in the early eighteen hundreds, but it was the news of 
the British victory in the Sino-British Opium War (1839) 
that alerted the leaders of Japan to the military potential 
of the West.70 Many within the Imperial court, and at the 
military headquarters at Edo found it incomprehensible that 
the great state of China could be brought so low by 
"barbarians." 
At first the warrior-class were unable to fathom the 
nature of their predicament.  Few recognized that two 
hundred and fifty years of isolation had left them far 
behind the West in the development of weapons and tactics. 
Shinto beliefs, and the warrior's code provided an initial 
false bravado to their plans.  As one bushido knight wrote, 
The strong point of the nation of the gods 
[Japan] is the sword and the spear; even though 
the barbarians may have warships and guns, 
nevertheless we still hold these fellows in our 
grasp.71 
A combination of the supernatural power that had summoned 
the kamikaze winds against the Mongol invaders in the 
69Norman, pp. 136-138. 
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thirteenth century, and the strength of the Bushido   (way of 
the warrior) code would spare the Japanese islands, the home 
of the gods, from harm. 
The appearance in July of 1853 of Commodore Matthew 
Perry's steamships, moving "without regard to wind and 
tide," provoked "astonishment and consternation"72 among the 
bakufu officials.  Perry, playing his stronger hand, 
delivered a letter from the American President addressed to 
the Emperor requesting, among other things, open ports, 
coaling stations, and humane treatment for shipwrecked 
sailors in Japan.73  Stating that he would return in one 
year, Perry departed, leaving a not so subtle threat that he 
expected an affirmative reply to his nation's requests. 
Edo faced two equally grim options; refusal of Perry's 
requests risked immediate, humiliating military defeat while 
acceptance of limited contact with the West (while 
simultaneously "Westernizing" the military to meet the 
threat) left the Shogunate open to attack from domestic 
forces.74 When Perry returned (strategically early in an 
attempt to catch the Japanese off-guard) the bakufu 
reluctantly announced that they would recognize the rights 
of shipwrecked American sailors, that two ports would be 
open to American ships, and that coal would be made 
available.  Trade negotiations were delayed pending the 
appointment of an American consul to Japan. 
Perry's opening of Japan began to unravel the feudal 
fabric that had bound the nation together as the Shogunate's 
past actions came back to haunt them.  For centuries the Edo 
military government had legitimized its rule by presenting 
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itself as the protectors of the Imperial institution and its 
extended manifestation, the Japanese nation, but Edo's weak 
response to Perry's demands proved that the "barbarian- 
subduing -generalissimo" was unable to subdue the barbarians. 
The Emperor, and the nation were in danger.  The forces 
which had been relegated to outlying areas, or second tier 
social status began to agitate against Edo, rallying their 
supporters around the "endangered" Imperial institution. 
Edo's momentary instability in the wake of Perry's arrival 
presented an opening to the clans which had previously been 
blocked from influence to step forward and publicly condemn 
the Edo government.75 For more than a generation the Mito 
clan had agitated for a return to direct Imperial rule. 
After the appearance of Perry's squadron they increased 
their rhetoric ten-fold, creating the popular slogan son-no 
Jo-i   (revere the Emperor--expel the barbarians).76 In the 
summer months of 1866 the armies of the tozama  clans Choshu, 
Satsuma, Tosa, and Mito met a much larger Tokugawa army and 
battled them to a standstill.  In a first look of things to 
come, the rebels swallowed their pride, purchased a shipment 
of rifles from British traders, and proceeded into battle 
carrying both swords and modern weaponry.77 
The failure of the Shogunate to defeat the rebellious 
forces, even when they had a preponderance of forces, 
accelerated the erosion of their popular support.  One year 
later the rebel forces captured Kyoto and the young, newly 
enthroned Emperor Mutsuhito.  On September 3, 1867, the last 
Tokugawa Shogun, Tokugawa Keiki, abdicated his office, 
ceding defacto rule of the nation to the Emperor, and ending 
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the nearly eight hundred years of military rule in Japan 
that had begun with Minamoto Yoritomo in 1185.  Four months 
later, after transferring the Imperial capital from Kyoto to 
the impressive castle-palace of the Tokugawa's in Edo 
(renamed Tokyo or Eastern Capital), the Emperor, assisted by 
his young champions, announced the restoration of the 
ancient form of direct Imperial government.78 
At the time of his "restoration," the Meiji Emperor 
(Meiji or "Enlightened Rule" was chosen as the Reign name 
for the Emperor) was sixteen years old.  Neither he, nor his 
court possessed the experience necessary to govern the 
nation, and so real power in the opening days of the 
restoration remained with the former tozama clan samurai who 
had led the revolt against the Tokugawa.  Revolutionaries 
against the tyranny of Tokugawa rule, following the 
restoration these young men adjusted their focus to the new 
problems at hand, and became successful innovators of 
national policy.  In the early days of the Meiji government, 
the new Imperial advisors sat in council, offering the 
Emperor their unanimous recommendations.  However, the young 
samurai advisors to the Emperor represented more than a 
simple shift of power from one feudal alliance to another, 
they were, in fact, a revolutionary movement acting to 
protect the Emperor and the nation from the threats posed by 
the West. 
Proximity to power brought to these young warriors an 
awareness of the true magnitude of the West's power and 
technological advancement.  Privately realizing that their 
revolutionary promise to "expel the barbarians" was 
unrealistic, the new leaders simply forgot it, and shifted 
their focus to ensuring the long term survivability of the 
government.  In a move that had many parallels with the 
period of early Chinese borrowing, the Meiji leaders made an 
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early fundamental decision to adapt certain features of the 
West to Japanese culture as a means of preserving the 
Japaneseness of that culture.  In April, 1868 the Imperial 
government, in an attempt to both quiet popular unrest, and 
to chart a strategic course, promulgated the Five Article 
Oath (also known as the Charter Oath) under the Imperial 
seal.  This pact promised the creation of deliberative 
assemblies, the freedom of the people to pursue their own 
interests, and, perhaps most importantly, that knowledge 
from the outside world would be sought in order to 
strengthen the Emperor's government.79 
Initial attempts at creating an effective government 
were at best clumsy and ineffective.  The continuing 
influence of daimyo and samurai representatives blocked any 
initiatives which challenged existing feudal structures.  In 
March, 1869 the young Satsuma and Choshu members of the 
Meiji government, in a move to assert Imperial control over 
the 260 feudal domains, convinced the heads of their own 
clans to return control of their domains to the Emperor. 
The strength of the Imperial institution, due to the Shinto 
belief system, forced the leaders of other clans to follow 
suit or risk charges of disloyalty and disrespect to the 
Emperor.  Within six months all daimyo followed the Satsuma 
and Choshu example.  Initially kept in place as Imperial 
governors, these daimyo were soon lured from their positions 
by inducements of large pensions, and court peerage.  By the 
summer of 1871 the provincial system was replaced by a newly 
organized prefectual system which cut across centuries old 
geographical boundaries, and clan loyalties.80 
Food shortages, rapid inflation, and the influence of 
foreign trade all acted to destabilize the social structure 
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of early Meiji Japan, and the Satsuma-Choshu (Sat-Cho) 
clique's attack upon the existing feudal power structure did 
little to ease the unrest.  To counter the growing strife a 
new ten thousand man army was created in 1871.  Composed of 
samurai volunteers from the Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa clans, 
the new army was outfitted with Western uniforms, weapons 
and trained in the latest Western tactics.  Proud products 
of hundreds of years on top of the Japanese social ladder, 
the members of the new army were suspicious, and distrustful 
of the new "barbarian" tactics.  This resistance to Western 
military concepts led the Meiji government to the 
realization that, while the new army was sufficient for the 
task of maintaining stability in the early days of reform, 
it would not be the instrument of national greatness, 
instead Japan would raise a Western-style, conscription 
army. 
The conscription army (and many of the later reforms to 
that army) was the product of Yamagata Aritomo (183 8-1922). 
A young Choshu samurai who had played minor roles in the 
Restoration war, Yamagata would eventually become one of the 
most influential men in the emerging Japanese Government. 
Intensely interested in Western military tactics, 
techniques, and policies, Yamagata toured Europe in 1870, 
carefully noting the qualities and characteristics of the 
European armies.81 Upon his return to Japan, he wrote a 
memorial to the Emperor detailing his observations and 
recommendations.  On January 10, 1873 the Emperor, acting 
upon Yamagata's memorial, issued an Imperial Mandate 
Concerning Conscription which required all Japanese men 
(regardless of their social status) to serve three years of 
active service in the nation's military to be followed by• 
four years in the reserve.82 
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The universalization of military service began to erode 
the dominating position of the samurai class in Japanese 
society.  This process received a boost in early 1876 when 
the government outlawed the wearing of swords in public. 
Later that same year the government discontinued the 
samurai's stipends, compensating them with large 
governmental bonds to use as they saw fit.  Some of these 
fading warriors parlayed their bonds into huge fortunes 
while others quickly squandered their money, descending into 
a quagmire of bitterness, debauchery, and self-pity.  Many 
of these disgruntled ex-warriors began to agitate for a 
return to the "golden" days of military rule.  In 1877 a 
band of young, aspiring shoguns attacked a company of 
government troops sent to remove a cache of government arms 
from the troubled south-western region of Japan.  It was the 
beginning of the end for the samurai, a revolt led by a most 
reluctant leader. 
Saigo Takamori was, in life and death, revered by both 
his enemies and his friends as a warrior god.  At age 27 he 
was a minor official in the Satsuma clan government.  By age 
45 he had become a leading figure of the new government, a 
counsellor to the Emperor, the commander in chief of the 
Imperial guards, and a marshal of the Japanese Army.83  In 
1873 Saigo, who had remained behind while many of the Meiji 
leaders participated in a fact-finding tour of European 
capitals, responded angrily to the Korean Court's refusal to 
recognize the new Japanese regime.  True to his samurai 
beliefs, he advocated an invasion of the peninsular nation 
to extract retribution for the insult done to his Emperor's 
government.  The touring Meiji leaders, increasingly aware 
that turmoil would only invite further European interest in 
Japan, hurried home to rein in the great warrior.  Saigo, 
perceiving his honor sullied by politicians, resigned in 
disgust, and returned to his home in the south-western 
3Morris, p. 248. 
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region of Japan where he founded schools for the purpose of 
educating the region's youth in the philosophies of the 
warrior.  It was these students that launched the attack 
against the Imperial forces in the area. 
When informed later of the attack, Saigo bowed to his 
destiny and accepted the leadership of the rebellion.  It 
was to be the last stand of the samurai against the tides of 
change.  In 1877 a conscription army of 43,000 defeated 
Saigo's force of 18,000 in a series of battles throughout 
the Satsuma and Choshu provinces.  In September Saigo, 
wounded and unable to carry on, committed ceremonial 
suicide.  He was fifty years of age.84 
B.  IMITATION OF THE WEST 
Admittedly the defeat of the samurai rebels in 1877 did 
seem to indicate that Japan was committed to putting the 
past, with all of its feudal remnants, behind it in order to 
assume its place among the modern nations of the world.  The 
calls of son-no jo-i  had all faded from memory, but Japan 
had still to formulate a policy capable of reversing the 
unequal treaties which had been forced upon Japan by the 
Western powers when they had opened the nation twenty years 
before.  Even before the Restoration in 1868 young Japanese 
leaders from the Satsuma and Choshu provinces began to 
travel abroad in an attempt to renegotiate the unequal 
treaties which had been forced upon Japan by the Western 
powers in the eighteen-fifties, and to accumulate knowledge 
of the world.  Unable to bring about changes in the treaty 
relationships, the delegations did witness the strengths of 
Western governments, industry, and military power, and 
returned to Japan with the intention of empowering the 
civil, industrial, and military sectors of the nation.ss 
84Vlastos, Stephen, "Opposition movements in early Meiji," 
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Establishing the motto fukoku kyohei   (enrich the nation, 
strengthen the country), they set out to meet the world head 
on. 
The largest challenge facing the young government was 
modernizing Japan's economic base.  After abolishing the 
feudal provinces, the government moved to establish a 
standard national currency, replacing the rice based 
monetary system of the Tokugawa era.  Utilizing profits from 
silk export along with some creative financing, the Japanese 
government invested heavily in the construction of 
railroads, and telegraph networks to link the nation's 
economic centers.  Coal deposits fueled foreign steamships 
and burgeoning Japanese power plants.  Cheap labor and new 
technology brought in from America stimulated textile 
production and export.  In keeping with the goal of 
strengthening the nation, the government invested heavily in 
the production of munitions, and ships.  By 1882 the 
government reported that it owned and operated no less than 
three shipyards, fifty-two factories, ten mines, and five 
munitions works; all built without incurring significant 
debt to foreign concerns.86 Japan was well on its way to 
achieving economic modernity. 
The Meiji constitution of 1889 emerged from a social 
tug of war between popular forces who desired democratic 
freedoms and the leaders of the Meiji government bent on 
increasing the ability of the central government to meet the 
growing external and internal challenges to the nation.  In 
1873 a popular Freedom and People's Rights movement arose in 
the outlying areas to demand that the government move to 
establish the working national assemblies that had been 
promised by the Emperor and his councilors in the Charter- 
Oath.  Contact with the West fueled the fires of unrest as 
intellectuals within Japan acquired knowledge of the British 
and American democratic systems of government.  This 
6Borton, pp. 154-156. 
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knowledge only increased the level of agitation over the 
government's inability to reverse the unequal treaty rights 
granted to the West.  Within six years the Freedom and 
People's Rights movement migrated from the countryside into 
the cities, and had a particularly powerful following in the 
capital city of Tokyo.  The Satsuma and Choshu leaders in 
the Meiji government increasingly became the targets of 
popular unrest.87 
By 1880 these former samurai had been in power for 
twelve years, and had no desire to leave soon.  Their 
original revolutionary fervor and loyalty to the Emperor had 
dissipated.  In its place grew a sense of self-importance 
and a self-justifying responsibility to the good of the 
nation.  The nation would be best served, they thought, 
through their continued rule, and so they acted to block 
"destabilizing" democratic movements.  However, the Emperor, 
responding to the growing unrest, had announced that the 
nation would have a constitution by the end of the decade. 
The challenge to the "Oligarchy," as they were known in the 
popular press, was to carry out the Emperor's wishes while 
still retaining the power they had come to enjoy.89 
It fell to a young councillor, Ito Hirobumi to formulate 
the Oligarchy's response to the Emperor's challenge.  In a 
one year tour of the Western capitals, Ito collected 
information about the constitutions and governments of 
Western nations.  He rejected the American and British 
models as being too liberal for Japan's (i.e. the 
Oligarchy's) needs, and chose instead the Prussia model with 
its powerful monarchy and strong central government.89 
87Duus, Peter, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho 
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In the years that followed his return to Japan, he and the 
other members of the Oligarchy debated the exact wording and 
structure of the constitution and government.  They, as a 
group, established a pattern that would be followed 
throughout the rest of the pre-World War Two period.  For 
every new freedom granted to the people, they crafted a well 
hidden restriction. 
In 1885, in preparation for the parliamentary government 
that would follow, the Oligarchs sought and received from 
the Emperor authorization for the formation of an executive 
cabinet, which was staffed entirely by members of the Sat- 
Cho clique, to be directly responsible to the Emperor for 
the execution of his laws.90 Inherently distrusting the 
popular wishes of the people, the Oligarchs created a 
constitution which granted to the executive branch the power 
to check the wishes of both the legislature and the 
judiciary, but did not grant reciprocating balancing powers 
against the executive.  Later the Emperor authorized (on the 
advice of his Sat-Cho councilors) the formation of a Privy 
Council which would have the function of advising the 
Emperor on political matters and recommending Prime 
Ministers of the Cabinet.91 
As the Meiji era came to its close, a new institution 
arose to preserve the primacy of the Oligarchs.  The elite 
Oligarchs who had occupied the Premier's seat on multiple 
occasions became known as the Genro  (elders).  Upon ending 
their careers as cabinet Ministers, these original members 
of the Restoration were "requested" (actually they 
themselves drafted the requests) by the Emperor to "hold 
themselves ready" to assist him as he saw fit.  This 
informal council of elder statesmen existed outside of the 
constitutional structure and yet were instrumental in the 
initiation and cessation of wars, and the formation of 
90Ito, p. 99. 
91Beasley, pp. 129-130. 
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cabinets.  No longer young enough to hold power themselves, 
they ruled vicariously through young proteges who filled 
their former positions in the cabinet.92 Hence, as the 
government developed its outwardly Western appearance, it 
continued the traditions that reached back to the days of 
Kamakura.  Power resided not in the public officeholder 
familiar to the Western observer, but in the kingmakers 
behind the curtain.  It would be the influence of a 
kingmaker that would bring militarism in Japan to its 
fruition. 
Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Prime Minister of the Imperial Cabinet, President of 
the Privy Council, and Genro  became one of the greatest 
kingmakers in modern Japanese history.  A man of progressive 
and stalwart conservative tendencies, Yamagata desired a 
place for his nation among the great powers of the world 
while he simultaneously worried about his people loosing 
their "old ways."93 Foreign threats, domestic political 
uprisings and internal mutinies during the eighteen 
seventies had planted within Yamagata an aspiration to 
create a powerful army and a place for it in the Japanese 
government that was both independent of political movements, 
and political control.  The only institution that approached 
this state of independence was the Emperor, and Yamagata 
consistently sought to identify the military in Japan with 
the ancient Imperial institution. 
The Emperor's Imperial Mandate Concerning Conscription, 
requiring each male citizen to serve in the military, served 
as an important opening step, but even this move was 
eclipsed by the establishment of a centrally controlled 
national education system in 1871.  Organized along 
hierarchical lines, with the responsibility for curriculum 
92Hackett, pp. 212-213. 
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choices resting ultimately with a Minister of Education in 
Tokyo, the schools served as the frontline of the 
government's battle to create a stronger Japan.  Designed by 
the Oligarchy, the national curriculum went beyond standard 
language, literacy, and mathematical subjects to promote the 
nationalistic Shinto myths as accepted truths.  Exalted to 
express their loyalty to the Emperor (and his government) in 
every facet of their lives, the youth of Japan were mentally 
prepared for military service well in advance of their 
induction dates.94 
Yamagata, realizing that shear numbers would not offset 
the West's military advantages, pushed additional reforms 
through the government.  In 1875 he established the first 
Japanese military academy, modeled after the British and 
Prussian academies, to train and provide additional 
education for the officers who would lead Japan's new army. 
Later, in 1878, Yamagata succeeded in establishing a 
Prussian-style General Staff to oversee and coordinate 
administrative and command functions for the growing 
Japanese army.  This command structure drew its legitimacy 
from the Emperor, and the Emperor's 1882 Imperial Rescript 
to Soldiers and Sailors (ghostwritten by Yamagata) commanded 
all to recognized that, "We are your supreme Commander-in- 
Chief."  Further ordering Japan's soldiers and sailors to be 
loyal to the state, respectful of seniors, valorous, 
faithful, and righteous, the Rescript promised that, if they 
faithfully carried out their duties, "the might and dignity 
of Our Empire will shine in the world."  The rescript's 
statement that the Emperor must, "always remain the supreme 
civil and military power" served to remind the other 
branches of government of the traditional duality between- 
the civil government and the military government that had 
94Passin, H., Society and Education in Japan. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1965) pp. 154-157.  For full text of 
Education Rescript, see Appendix A. 
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existed in Japan since ancient times.95 
Yamagata's choice of Prussian structures represented a 
change in Japan's civil-military direction.  in the days 
following the Restoration in 1868 the new Japanese 
government had relied upon the French for advice in military 
matters.  A French military mission arrived in Japan in 1872 
to train the initial cadre of Japanese officers for the new 
imperial army.  They remained to serve as instructors at the 
new military academies and as advisors to the Imperial 
government, but news of France's defeat in the Franco- 
Prussian war damaged the mission's prestige and led to their 
dismissal in 1880.  within a few short years a Prussian 
officer, Major Jacob Meckel, arrived in Japan to instruct 
and advise the new army on the use of the new weapons being 
produced in Japanese factories. 
in 1885, during the formulation process of the 
Constitution, Yamagata gained acceptance for his view that 
the military must be answerable only to the Emperor, and 
thus independent of civil control.  Later the independent 
nature of the military would bring cabinets crashing down as 
War and Navy Ministers, chosen exclusively from the lists of 
three and four star generals and admirals, tendered their 
letters of resignation.  if no other qualified officers 
would serve, the remainder of the cabinet had no choice but 
to resign in mass. 
On February n,(Empire Day, the day when the mythical 
first Emperor Jimmu ascended the throne) 1889 the Emperor 
Meiji promulgated the new Constitution.  m the first and 
third Articles announced that the «Empire of Japan shall be 
reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for 
ages eternal» and that these Emperors were and are »sacred 
and inviolable.»  The constitution made it very clear that 
government in Japan drew its power from a divine Emperor 
^af™f»^^ - so^rs and Sailors Rescript, see Appendix B. 
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The constitution itself was presented as a "gift" from the 
Emperor to his people.96 
in the twenty-one years that followed the restoration of 
imperial power the nation had progressed industrially, 
militarily, and constitutionally, but the unequal treaties 
remained along with other remnants of earlier times.  The 
»Oligarchy's» view of the world was still largely colored by 
the bushido values, and military ethos that had influenced 
Japanese society for eight hundred years.  While these 
leaders, in dress and mannerisms, increasingly resembled 
their western counterparts, internally they remained 
samurai; sworn to defend the honor and interests of their 
nation and Emperor.  The imperial competition between 
nations for colonies, resources and wealth was interpreted 
as an extension of the conflict between individual warriors. 
If the West failed to recognize Japan's great attributes, 
then the nation had no choice but to enter the competition 
and claim their rightful place among the nations of the 
world. 
C.  IMPERIAL ASPIRATIONS 
Yamagata Aritomo, in a speech to the Diet (Japan's new 
parliamentary assembly) on December 6, 1890, suggested Japan 
defend not only its line of sovereignty, which encompassed 
the nation's territorial possessions, but also its economic, 
diplomatic, and military interests in those areas 
surrounding the home islands which he termed the nation's 
»line of advantage.»97 In the years that followed, serving 
alternately as Chief of the General Staff, Home Minister, 
and Prime Minister, Yamagata extended his earlier remarks to 
advance the expansion of the nation's military power as the 
96Quigley, pp. 335-336. 
"Hackett, pp. 138-139. 
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path to equality with Japan's Western counterparts." His 
unrelenting negotiations with colleagues garnered a military- 
appropriation representing one third of the national budget 
in the early years of the Meiji government, but now Yamagata 
argued that this level of commitment only served to raise 
Japan to the level of a third or second rate power." 
Equality with the Western powers, and subsequent reversal of 
Japan's treaty status (the major issue of the day), could 
only be accomplished through embracing an offensive strategy 
for the nation's military forces. 
In the nineteenth century European states articulated a 
doctrine of national power based upon colonial position, 
resources, and markets.100 For years Yamagata observed as 
the foreign powers carve up the formerly great "Middle 
Kingdom" of China, but was hesitant to enter the fray for 
fear of attracting European animosity while Japan's defenses 
were weak.  In 1890, the year of the "line of advantage" 
speech, Yamagata, the leader of a relatively strong military 
force, began to direct his attention towards Korea. 
Japan had been instrumental in the opening of Korea to 
outside trade twenty years after their own "opening" by 
Commodore Perry, gaining in the process open ports and 
extra-territorial rights for Japanese citizens in Korea.101 
Initially focused on business, Japan's inexpensive textile 
goods brought great profits back to the home economy. 
Rising competition within the Korean government between 
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factions supporting the traditional Chinese style of 
government and groups favoring the new dynamic Japanese 
national modernization led China and Japan to withdrawal 
their forces from the peninsula in 1885, waiting for one 
faction or the other emerged as the leader.  Neither power 
was militarily prepared to force the issue at that time.102 
China, now in her fading days as an Empire, continued to 
assert her claims of paramount interests in the peninsula 
while Yamagata's allies in Japan's military camp pronounced 
Korea "a dagger poised at the heart" of the nation, and 
argued that it should be subjugated to the Japanese will, or 
at least rendered neutral.103 
Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, who had negotiated the 1885 
agreement to remove forces from Korea, opposed the 
expansionists' goals, favoring instead continued internal 
economic expansion.  His stand, in direct contradiction to 
Yamagata, represented a widening gulf between the two men 
and a growing split in the unity of the Genro.104 Personal 
ambition was overtaking the bonds of loyalty that existed 
between the Satsuma and Choshu clansmen.  Now the Ito 
faction faced the Yamagata faction in a competition for 
political dominance.  It was a fight between the forces of 
civil government, and the military. 
Outside events ultimately decided the competition as 
public dissatisfaction with the Genro's handling of the 
unequal treaty dilemma generated new political parties who 
aspired to wrest control of the government through 
democratic process.  Ito, blocked in the Diet by partisan 
intransigence, had been forced to dissolve the legislature 
'Korea. (Seoul: Hakwon-sa LTD, 1963) p. 76. 
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only to witness more opposition emerge from the elections. 
To circumvent the popular opposition, Ito resorted to the 
use of Imperial decree to enact his political agenda.  In 
the end the events of the summer of 1894 terminated Ito's 
opposition to Yamagata's expansionistic ideas, and his need 
to use Imperial influence to control the government. 
The Sino Japanese war of 1894-95 stands as the watershed 
of modern Japanese history.  Before the war the trends of 
Japanese politics seemed to point to the eventuality of 
sound constitutional democracy, and Japanese diplomacy was 
characterized by patience.  Following the war the nation's 
politics would be dominated by the military, and its 
diplomacy would be exercised at the end of a stick. 
In the spring of 1894 a band of Korean rebels, known as 
the Tonghaks, marched on Seoul calling for a return to the 
virtues of "Eastern Learning" and decrying the corruption of 
the West and all of its imitators (specifically the 
Japanese).  Sensing the direction the Korean situation was 
heading, General Yamagata established a wartime Imperial 
General Headquarters at the Imperial palace in June.  Upon 
hearing of a Korean request for Chinese assistance, 
Yamagata, acting within the terms of the 1885 China-Japan 
agreement, dispatched Japanese troops to the peninsula to 
protect Japanese nationals.105 Quickly neutralizing the 
Tonghaks; Japanese and Chinese troops remained in Korea, 
eyeing each other with increasing distrust.  On July 23, 
1894 Japanese troops compelled the Korean King to order all 
Chinese troops out of the country.  Eight days later Korea, 
and its Japanese "ally" declared war on China.106 
In Japan all political opposition to the Genro vanished 
in a wave of nationalistic enthusiasm.  The entire 
105Han, Woo-Keun, The History of Korea, trans, by Kyung-shik 
Lee, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1970) p. 410. 
106Key Treaties for the Great Powers: 1814-1914, Vol. 2, (New 
York: David and Charles, 1972) p. 670. 
53 
government supported the war as a means of establishing a 
greater Japanese presence on the Asian mainland.  State 
supported Shinto education programs in the Japanese schools, 
a product of the 1880 Education Rescript, had yielded a 
generation of citizens convinced of the superiority of their 
own race, and the divinity of their Emperor.  The Sino- 
Japanese war witnessed the first emergence of a pseudo- 
missionary complex in the Japanese as they fought to carry 
their superior system of life to other "barbarian" lands.107 
The mass support of the war effort aided Yamagata in his 
decision to establish the military's wartime headquarters at 
the Imperial palace.  There, under the Imperial umbrella, 
the military effectively isolated itself from any civil 
interference or control.  Domestic policy, diplomatic 
negotiations, economic allocation, and military strategy all 
carried the imprint of Yamagata's influence.  Issued in the 
name of the Emperor, the Commander in Chief, wartime orders 
carried the force of religious doctrine.  At war's end, less 
than a year after the initial declaration, the military had 
achieved a paramount position in the political process in 
Japan, effectively altering the course of Japan's 
constitutionally based, democratic development.108 
The war itself is remembered almost as an afterthought. 
Yamagata's well trained troops, utilizing superior armaments 
and tactics quickly overwhelmed and defeated their Chinese 
adversaries.  The Chinese forces, weakened by internal 
corruption, crumbled under the onslaught, and spent nearly 
all of the war in continuous retreat.  Ultimately pushed 
completely off of the Korean peninsula, Chinese troops later 
lost Port Arthur, the economically rich Liaotung Peninsula, 
0
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and the corridor leading into southern Manchuria.109  The war 
was a route, and, beyond confirming the precedent of 
military independence, produced two outcomes, both 
unplanned, that served to buttress public support for future 
military actions. 
The unequal relationship between Japan and the Western 
Powers was a constant humiliating reminder of Japan's 
earlier weakness.  The inability of the Meiji Oligarchs to 
effect a revision of the treaties led to rising public 
discontent and occasional outbreaks of violence throughout 
the post-Restoration period, and was the largest factor 
contributing to the dissenting tenor of political parties in 
Japan.  Even as tensions over the crises in Korea rose 
during the summer of 1894 the Diet * s attention remained 
fixated upon the question of treaty revision.  It was an 
extraordinary circumstance of history that on July 16, 1894 
Japanese Foreign Minister Akoi Shuzo, on a diplomatic 
mission to London, negotiated the first agreement with a 
major Western Power abolishing foreign extraterritoriality 
in Japan.110 Upon hearing of the long sought breakthrough, 
the Japanese public associated Britain's recognition of 
Japan's equal status with the nation's ongoing show of force 
in Korea.  As the war played out over the next year other 
major Powers followed London's example, further fueling the 
Japan's subconscious linkage of military might with 
international prestige. 
Following the war Japan's military received another 
inadvertent boost from the Great Powers of Europe.  The 
surrender Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed by Japan and China 
on April 17, 1895, obligated China to "recognize definitely 
the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea,' 
and further required the "Middle Kingdom" to permanently 
cede to Japan Formosa, the Pescadores islands, and the 
109Harries,   pp.   58-60 
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recently captured Liaotung Peninsula.  Additionally, China 
was asked to pay a large indemnity to Japan, to cover the 
costs of the war.111 The new wartime acquisitions brought 
new mineral wealth to Japan, and room for expansion.  None 
of the expansionists in Japan expected any challenge from 
the West, only increased respect and, perhaps, 
congratulations for learning the rules of the Imperialist 
game so quickly.  Very soon Japan became aware that it had 
yet to learn all of the rules of Europolitics. 
Russia, a nation which traversed the Eurasian landmass, 
had committed itself to the construction of a continent 
spanning railway, and hoped to secure a warm water port in 
either Korea or the Liaotung Peninsula to serve as the 
Eastern terminal of the line.  The Czar's government had not 
foreseen the quickness or magnitude of Japan's victory over 
their Chinese adversaries, but once the victory was evident, 
Russia (with the support of its German ally) had no choice 
but to earnestly pursue the reversal of Japan's wartime 
gains.  Within a week of the announcement of the terms of 
the Shimonoseki Treaty, Russia's diplomats approached other 
European Powers to ask their assistance in an intervention 
on China's behalf.  Soon thereafter Japan's Foreign Ministry 
was strongly "advised" by representatives of Russia, France, 
and Germany that it should renounce its claims to the 
Liaotung Peninsula, and remove its troops from Korea.112 
Strong enough to fight China, but not strong enough to stand 
up to three of the greatest Powers in Europe, Japan 
acquiesced. 
Japan's forced compliance with the demands of the three 
Powers triggered a wave of ethnocentric nationalism 
throughout the nation.  Following the Triple Intervention; 
Japan's relations with the world around it was tainted by 
the conviction that a nation's place in the international 
lxlKey Treaties for the Great Powers: 1814-1914. pp. 670-672 
!McDougall, pp. 386-387. 
56 
112 
community would be determined by the size, strength, and 
capabilities of its military forces.113 As one observer 
stated, "in diplomacy we are always beaten or cheated."114 
In the year following the Sino-Japanese War the Army 
"secured" permission to nearly double its size, adding six 
more divisions to the seven already in existence.  The 
Japanese Navy underwent a similar expansion in numbers and 
capabilities of units.  Between 1907 and 1911 the Army added 
an additional seven units to bring its total to nineteen. 
It sought continued growth throughout the nineteen- 
twenties.115 
As Japan entered the twentieth century, the 
characteristics that had emerged during the Sino-Japanese 
War were reenforced by subsequent experiences.  Japan's 
participation in the Boxer Rebellion relief effort (1900) , 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and in World War I (on the 
side of the British and their allies) heightened the 
domestic prestige of the military, brought international 
respect, new territorial acquisitions, and the economic 
benefits of Empire.  The unpopular outcome of the Portsmouth 
Treaty negotiations following Japan's surprising victory 
over Russia in 1905 served to prove the popular Japanese 
contention that Western diplomacy sought only to whittle 
away the gains of war paid for in Japanese blood. 
D. TAISHO DEMOCRACY 
On July 30, 1912 the Emperor Meiji died.  He had come to 
power as a young boy fifteen years of age, ill prepared to 
assume the actual control of the nation implied in his 
Restoration message of January, 1868.  As he grew older, and 
matured he began to take a more active role in government, 
but this never went beyond casual participation in the 
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debates of his advisors convened in Imperial Conference, or 
settling a disagreement between two factions in the 
Oligarchy.  The rapid growth and increasing complexity of 
the government soon left him relegated to the purely 
ceremonial functions that had occupied his predecessors. 
These he performed with skill, improvising along the way as 
he refashioned the throne into a human and divine 
institution.116 He reigned grandly, but he did not rule. 
The Meiji Emperor, a dynamic and forceful personality, 
was succeeded by his son Yoshihito, who took the reign name 
Taisho  or Great Rectification; reform.  Emperor Taisho, 
isolated throughout most of his life, overshadowed by his 
legendary father, physically frail, and mentally unstable 
during most of his years on the throne was ill-suited for 
the role of a living god demanded of him by his father's 
advisors.117 Instead his personal weakness would be linked 
in history to the outward decline of the Genro's power, and 
the rise of democratic party government in Japan. 
One of the major factors in the emergence of democracy 
during the Taisho Era was the rapid expansion of the 
nation's economy and per capita income.  Japan's weak 
response to the "advise" of the three European powers 
following the Sino-Japanese War convinced the populace of 
the importance of the Genro's belief that the nation should 
strengthen itself militarily and industrially if it was to 
command the respect of the world.  Cash received in the 
forms of indemnity payments from China (1895) and Russia 
(1905) served as the initial start-up capital for new 
copper, electricity, gas, shipbuilding, textile, steel 
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making, and canned goods industries.118 Geographically 
isolated from the major battle lines of World War I, Japan 
nonetheless contributed to the war effort by manufacturing 
war materials for the allied powers.  Factory production 
increased, and the average income for an industrial worker 
increased significantly drawing thousands of rural farm 
workers to the city in search of prosperity.119  Living in 
the close confines of city blocks, they became politically 
aware, and party leaders were quick to realize the potential 
influence of a work force mobilized along political lines. 
By the end of the second decade of the century the Power 
of the Genro was fading.  Many of the aging leaders lost the 
ability or desire to govern, preferring quiet retirement as 
they entered their final years.  Ito Hirobumi, the father of 
the Japanese constitution, had been killed by a Korean 
assassin in 1909.  Yamagata Aritomo, the old militarist, 
remained active in government into his eighth decade, but 
finally surrendered to death in 1922.  The demise of the 
Genro broke the Satsuma and Choshu lock on the national 
government, momentarily weakening the barriers that had 
blocked Japan's democratic development.120 
The party governments that emerged in the nineteen 
twenties took advantage of the Genro's decline to 
temporarily rollback the military's influence in government. 
This process was made possible by amending the original 
imperial Ordnance defining the War and Navy Ministerial 
portfolios to allow Prime Ministers to appoint retired three 
and four star generals and admirals to the posts.121 This 
amendment circumvented the active military's hold on 
118Borton, pp. 268-276. 
1190rchard,   John,   Japan's Economic Position-The Progress of 
Industrialization,    (New York:   McGraw-Hill/Whittlesey House,   1930) 
pp.   346-358. 
120Quigley,   pp.   104-106. 
121Lory,   p.   120. 
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government policy, allowing the cabinet to stabilize the 
growth of the military and to ultimately cut four divisions 
from the army, the first decline in strength since the 
modern army's inception. 
The liberal campaign to restrain the military extended 
into the diplomatic arena during the nineteen twenties.  In 
November of 1921 Prime Minister Hara dispatched a delegation 
to attend the Washington Disarmament Conference over the 
protests of his War and Navy Ministers.  The conference 
spawned the Naval Disarmament Treaty, which limited Japan's 
capital ship construction to a 5:5:3 ratio to Great Britain 
and the United States respectively.122 The 1930 London Naval 
Treaty extended the Washington Conference's 5:5:3 
shipbuilding ratio for another decade.123 The Navy Minister, 
feeling that the new treaty imposed restrictions on the 
Emperor's sovereign right of command, resigned, but failed 
to bring the government down.  In 1928 the militarists took 
another psychological blow when their government signed the 
Kellog-Briand Pact, outlawing aggressive war as an 
instrument of national policy.  The promise of peace was to 
be a false one.  Japan's past would betray its future. 
Militarism in Japan during the Meiji Era underwent an 
evolutionary process that allowed many of the ancient feudal 
traditions of the nation to survive the wave of 
modernization that swept through the country in the decades 
following the Restoration of the Emperor's government to 
defacto as well as dejure rule.  The success of the 
evolutionary process was due in no small part to the 
presence of a group of young, pragmatic, samurai in the new 
government who quickly realized that the best hope for 
preserving Japan's culture, and independence lay in a plan 
2Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United 
States of America, 1776-1949. (Washington: Department of State, 
1950) pp. 351-371. 
123Ibid. pp. 1055-1073. 
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that honored the nation's past while simultaneously looking 
towards the future that was evidenced in the practices and 
technologies of the West. 
The pride of the Yamato race, nurtured by the myths of 
the Shinto religion, drove these Genro to overcome the 
humiliation of their forced emergence into the modern world. 
Anxious to surmount the obstacles that had been placed in 
their path by two hundred and fifty years of isolation, they 
led their nation into an age of economic expansion and rapid 
industrialization.  Sensitive to Western judgements of 
backwardness, they adapted Western dress and mannerism into 
their everyday activities.  Cognizant of Western concepts of 
international competition, these samurai built, in less than 
four decades, a modern military capable of defeating a 
Western power in battle.  In their hearts, however, they 
remained what they were: Japanese Samurai. 
These leaders, the Genro, brought all of the Western 
appearances needed to convince the European and American of 
their equality, but the things that they taught to the 
Japanese people about international power, might, and 
position were based in the only social code that they 
understood; the code of the warrior.  Like their ancestors 
in the age of Shotoku and Chinese borrowing, they accepted 
the ideas of the outside world, but carefully layered them 
around the essential seed of the society, preserving what 
was essentially Japanese.  Through the use of Western 
structures such as national education, a conscription army, 
and Constitutional government they modernized their nation 
while simultaneously strengthening their position in the 
central government by employing popular myths from the past. 
They filled the role of the village elders for the entire- 
nation, drawing upon traditions that stretched back to the 
Uji clans of a thousand years before.  Only in the deaths of 
the Genro would Japan experience a temporary age of 
democracy.  But the old samurai of the Meiji Restoration, 
and the generations of samurai that had come before them, 
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would have the last laugh, as the power of the warriors 
code, let loose among the entire populace of Japan, would 
run rampant over the nation and the world beyond. 
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V.  THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE 
Brave warriors united in justice 
in spirit a match for a million 
ready like the myriad cherry blossoms to 
scatter in the spring sky 
of the Showa restoration.124 
At the time of the Meiji Restoration the great majority 
of the population of Japan was engaged in agriculture, 
commerce, or service trade.  Only an elite few were allowed 
to where the double swords which marked them as knights of 
the bushido code, and the ruling class of Japan.  Similarly, 
at the time of the 1868 revolution which returned the 
Emperor to defacto power, very few people in Japan were 
aware of his existence beyond the descriptions of him as a 
living god, exploited by the Tokugawa for their own benefit. 
How is it then that in less than a hundred years that 
the entire population of Japan, including the remote 
agrarian regions, would commit itself to a military goal of 
conquering a large portion of the Asian continent, and would 
do it in the name of the Emperor? How was the warrior ethic 
of the bushido knight conveyed to the entire population, and 
how did the semi-mystical Emperor become a figure whose name 
would be on the lips of thousands of dying men in their last 
moments of life? The answers to these questions will detail 
how history, culture, societal structure, and the people of 
Japan came together to produce the militarism that led to 
their national disaster. 
A.  THE PEOPLE 
By the end of the second decade of the twentieth 
century, the prestige of the military had suffered numerous 
challenges to its preeminent position in Japanese civil and 
social life.  The territorial gains of World War I, products 
of Japan's alliance with England, were offset by the defeat 
of Germany, which had been held aloft by the Meiji Oligarchs 
124Behr, Edward, Hirohito: Behind the Myth. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990) p. 124. 
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as the ideal of strong central government; eroding the Army 
and Navy's traditional level of public support. 
Subsequently the celebration of democratic aspirations by 
the victors of the war ignited a liberal movement in Japan 
that was decidedly anti-military.  Public discontent mounted 
as the national government, perhaps seeking influence or 
territory, committed forces to a relief expedition in 
Siberia which became a three year campaign of national 
frustration not unlike the United States' experience in 
Vietnam fifty years later.125 For a number of years military 
officers in Tokyo would wear civilian attire rather than 
face the animosity of fellow commuters. 
A contributing factor in the military's decline was the 
slow disintegration of the clan-based patronage system. 
Prince Yamagata's death in 1922 signified the end of the 
Choshu clan's hold on the Army command structure.  New 
leaders emerged who were unfamiliar with the clan alliances 
of the post Restoration era, and who had no vested interest 
in continuing them.  Often these commanders found themselves 
leading an officer corps that had no conception of clan 
values, themselves being sons of village shopkeepers, and 
landowners.126 
It was amongst these lower middle class merchants, and 
agrarian producers that the military found its reservoir of 
support during these difficult times.  To these people the 
conscription army symbolized the drive for equality in 
Japanese society.  In a society which had celebrated the 
martial spirit for hundreds of years, the conscription army 
allowed the son of a peasant to take up arms, and march as 
an equal with the sons of samurai, or even Imperial 
Princes.127 This strong sense of rural pride served to 
125Young, pp. 135-142, 160-166 
126Lory, p. 153-158. 
127lbid, pp. 17-18. 
64 
buttress the village society in the rough economic 
conditions of the nineteen twenties and thirties.  It also 
would provide the catalyst for the spread of militarism 
during that same period. 
As Japan entered the twentieth century, the rural 
countryside continued to exhibit the historic vestiges of 
Japan's traditional culture.  The population itself was more 
often than not a collection of interrelated families bound 
together by a common ancestry, a hereditary grant of land, 
and governed by Confucian principles first brought to the 
Japanese islands a thousand years before.  Not surprisingly 
the leadership structure closely resembled the uji clan 
councils of the distant past.  Lacking the "sophistication" 
of their contemporaries in the cities, the local village 
population continued to celebrate and worship the local 
Shinto deities associated with the village and its harvest. 
In the nineteen twenties and thirties Japan's economy 
was still forty-five percent agricultural, but that figure 
did not accurately represent the distribution of wealth. 
Despite its large portion of the economy, the agricultural 
sector produced their products on the sixteen percent of the 
land in Japan that was actually tillable.  Earning only an 
average of 3 00 yen a year, the farmer had to spend nearly 
forty percent of that income on the fertilizer needed to 
bring life to a soil long since exhausted by centuries of 
continuous use.128 Adding to these problems was a government 
policy of high taxation on the agricultural sector to fund 
the continued development of the nation's industries.129 By 
the mid-nineteen thirties agricultural indebtedness had 
risen to nearly six billion yen, or nearly seven hundred yen 
of debt per peasant farmer, more than twice his annual 
128Chamberlin, William H., Japan Over Asia. (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1937) p. 342. 
129Gunther, John, Inside Asia, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1939) p. 41. 
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income.130  Facing such insurmountable financial hurdles, 
rural farmers were often forced by banking agents (who also 
represented large financial concerns known as zaibatsu)   to 
contract out their own daughters to work in city factories. 
This was only the beginning of a rural aversion for the 
city.131 
Rural villagers, staid in their traditional values, 
rejected the liberal trends of city life.  In the nineteen 
twenties, waves of city inhabitants abandoned Japanese 
traditions for Western norms.  Kimonos were replaced by the 
three piece suit.  Priceless antique art was displaced by 
gaudy Western designs.  Even the Japanese alphabet was 
threatened by the conscious attempt of the leadership of 
Japan to introduce romanized writing.   Villagers, 
increasingly convinced that the cities of their country were 
inhabited only by shallow bankers, merchants, and tax 
collecting government officials who lived off the sweat of 
their labor, regarded these activities with contempt.132 
When the great earthquake of 1923 destroyed a large portion 
of Tokyo, the rural population placed great credence in the 
charge that it was the angry retribution of a great Shinto 
deity, who lived beneath the islands, for the wild living of 
the Tokyo populace.133 
The army, itself facing rough times during the liberal 
period of the twenties, appreciated the characteristics of 
the rural village society, and the tough soldiers it 
produced.  Stronger than their city counterparts, harder 
working, and more accepting of strict leadership, the 
130Chamberlin, pp. 338-339. 
131Gunther, pp. 39-40. 
132Storry, Richard, The Double Patriots. (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1973) p. 11. 
133Poole, Otis M., The Death of Old Yokohama in the Great 
Japanese Earthquake of September l. 1923. (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1968) pp. 27-61. 
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village soldier fit easily into the army's hierarchical 
structure.134  For its part the army worked with the village 
leadership; encouraging popular enthusiasm for the draft by 
calling upon the villages natural Shinto based patriotism. 
Family concerns were eased by promises to take good care of 
their sons.  Typical of these activities is a letter that 
often followed the initial draft announcement. 
Greetings to the Father and Elder Brother, 
We have learned that your son and brother will 
shortly experience the greatest joy and 
satisfaction possible to one of our nation by 
joining our second company.  We congratulate 
you...When your son and brother enters the 
barracks, the officers of the company will take 
your place in looking after his welfare.  We will 
be to him as a stern father and a loving mother. 
We will always be concerned with his two fold 
training, body and mind, so that in belonging to 
the Army he may become a good soldier and a loyal 
subject of the Emperor.  We want to be able to 
teach him in such a way that he may be able to 
realize the highest hope of a member of our 
race...135 
Soldiers returning from their period of active service 
were particularly welcome in the village community.  Their 
experiences and the harsh discipline of the Army rounded 
them out.  Village leaders often described the returnees as 
"total men" capable of immediately assuming leadership roles 
in the community.136 So valued were the qualities of the ex- 
soldiers that they even benefited in the process of 
matrimony, often receiving the pick of the village maidens 
in the arranged marriages that still dominated village 
romance.137 The Army leaders, for their part, saw an 
134Chamberlin, p. 242. 
13SLory, p. 25. 
13SSmethurst, Richard J., A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese 
Militarism. (Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 1974) 
pp. 93-95. 
137Lory, p. 29. 
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opportunity to benefit themselves by taking advantage of 
this local prestige. 
In the last decade of his life, the old militarist, 
Marshall Yamagata Aritomo had attempted to pass his mantle 
of leadership to his disciple, Tanaka Giichi.  Tanaka, a 
Choshu clansman, had served with distinction in the Sino- 
Japanese War, and had gone on to become a leading Russia 
expert.  By the second decade of the century, both Yamagata 
and his disciple were convinced of the growing danger of 
"total war."  Each felt that Japan's only hope in the face 
of a fully mobilized Western enemy lay in a strategy of 
"National Unity" whereby the entire population would be 
utilized for the cause of victory.  The naturally patriotic, 
and socially conservative rural populace had long defended 
its values and interests, but Tanaka happened upon the idea 
of expanding their support to national issues while 
maintaining their structurally strong social order.  He 
wanted to create "national villagers" who would identify 
with the ideas of "National Unity" in the same way that they 
supported the interests of their own villages.138 
Recognizing the prestige of their servicemen on reserve 
status in the villages of the nation, Tanaka and Yamagata 
founded the Imperial Military Reserve Association on 
November 3, 1910 to serve as a conduit of "National 
Unity."139 The Army, though desirous of the material 
benefits of modernization, was not yet ready to give up the 
social history of the samurai that provided them with their 
identity.  It is a fact of history that in the Army 
leadership's pursuit of unity through the use of cultural 
"values," the Emperor, and other rallying points, that 
somehow the monster of militarism got away from them.140 
138Smethurst, p. xvi. 
139Ibid, p. l. 
140Ibid, pp. xx-xxi. 
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B.  AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS 
Early on in the development of the Reserve Association, 
Tanaka had a brilliant insight which guaranteed the success 
of the venture.  Contrary to similar militaristic 
organizations in Europe, the Reserve Association built upon 
the existing social structure and organization, rather than 
imposing a new one.141 Village leaders, landowners and 
merchants, were called upon to head the new organizations, 
and group pressures insured the support and cooperation of 
the remainder of the village population.  Tanaka recognized 
the power of the social-hierarchical system that had been in 
force for over a thousand years, and was able to harness it 
to his bidding.142 
The Reserve Association was nominally organized to allow 
Army reservists the opportunity to meet together to maintain 
their martial skills.  Calisthenics, close order drill, and 
the ever present discussions of the Emperor-based, Shinto 
belief system dominated the weekly meetings.  As the 
organization developed, building upon the prestige of the 
returning servicemen, it gained a greater opportunity to 
affect village life.  As a vine slowly surrounds another 
plant, this auxiliary military organization slowly 
infiltrated every aspect of life in rural Japan. 
In July of 1926 the first of a string of Military Youth 
Training Centers was dedicated in Japan, and was quickly 
followed by the founding of the National Defense Women's 
Association.143 Guided by a cadre of instructors 
representing the most enthusiastic, and patriotic members of 
the Reserve Association,144 these organizations pursued 
activities that appeared to be perfectly benign, reflecting 
141lbid, pp. 95-96. 
142Ibid, pp. xv-xvi. 
143Ibid, pp. 37-45. 
144Ibid, pp. 118-121. 
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many of the same activities found in American community- 
organizations.  They organized volunteer fire fighting 
squads, planned and executed village level public works, 
provided disaster relief, and aid to the families of local 
men on active duty in the nation's armed forces. 
Had these organizations limited themselves to this level 
of civic involvement, historians would have no cause to 
suspect militaristic intent, but their participation in the 
community went further.  The Youth Training Centers 
conducted weekly military drill sessions, the Defense 
Woman's Association developed plans for assisting the 
government in a time of war, and, perhaps most insidiously, 
the Reservist's Association took over the ethics classes in 
the public schools which Japanese youths were required to 
attend for six years.145 These classes, strongly based in 
the doctrines of Shinto, promoted three principles; loyalty 
to the throne, a sense of mission in Asia, and a belief in 
the superior, inborn virtue of the Yamato race.146 
The source of this virtue, mission, and loyalty, was the 
Emperor himself.  Shinto stressed that the islands of Japan 
had been formed and inhabited by a race of gods who 
eventually took on a human form.  These primal inhabitants 
lived under the rule of the descendants of the chief deity, 
Amaterasu, the sun goddess, who were enthroned as the 
Emperors of Japan in 660 BC.  All current inhabitants of the 
island were descendants of this early society, and thus 
represented an extended family under the leadership of an 
Imperial father-figure.  The auxiliary organizations, 
through word and deed, reminded the village of its link to 
the nation as a whole by strengthening its loyalty to the 
Emperor fatherhead.  Their level of success led one 
contemporary observer to state, "Indeed loyalty and filial 
14SGrew, Joseph C, Report From Tokyo. (New York: simon and 
Schuster, 1942) pp. 50-54. 
146Storry, p. 5. 
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piety [to the Emperor} as one is the flower of our national 
entity, and is the cardinal point of our people's morals."147 
Tanaka and Yamagata had succeeded beyond their expectations, 
they had created a national village supporting their cause 
in the name of the Emperor. 
in 1924, after a long and debilitating illness, that had 
left him physically and mentally crippled, the Taisho 
Emperor died.  His successor, the Crown Prince Hirohito, had 
been the first Imperial Prince in Japanese history to travel 
abroad, visiting Europe in 1921.  Trained and educated by 
court advisors, the Prince believed his role to be that of a 
Constitutional Monarch, such as he had observed in Britain. 
On the day of his enthronement, perhaps as a sign of his 
outlook on the world, he announced that his reign name would 
be Showa,   or Enlightened Peace.148 Whether he was a pawn, or 
an active conspirator in the actions of his government that 
followed, the fact remains that it was during this period 
that the uniqueness of Japanese militarism placed its stamp 
on the political evolution of Eastern Asia. 
C.  THE RISE OP MILITARY FACTIONS 
Although Yamagata Aritomo's death in 1922 effectively 
ended the era of Choshu clan control of the army, he did 
leave a lasting legacy.  Through his tireless efforts, the 
Japanese military occupied a special place in the national 
polity of Japan.  The Emperor held the position of Commander 
in Chief, and the military felt themselves to be the 
instrument of his, or the nation-state's will.  This 
relationship, as described in the Emperor Meiji's Rescript 
to Soldiers and Sailors, predated the Constitution, and 
possessed a higher position in Japan's civil-judicial- 
147 Ibid, p. 48 
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religious hierarchy than mere law.149 
Following Yamagata's passing, no single individual 
emerged to maintain order within the Army.  Tanaka Giichi 
attempted to step into his mentor's shoes, but his political 
interests absorbed his energies.  Discipline relaxed as non- 
Choshu officers began to challenge the clan forces which had 
previously blocked their promotions.  The social forces of 
the post-World War I democratic movement began to take its 
toll.150 Within a short time, the Army would appear 
leaderless, with no cohesive vision of its future. 
Slowly, as the years of the nineteen twenties began to 
roll by, the power within the military began to shift.  By 
nineteen twenty seven, thirty percent of the Army's junior 
officers were the sons of shopkeepers and landowners. 
Nearly ninety percent of the enlisted soldiers hailed from 
working class backgrounds.151 Representing a different 
demographic section of Japanese society than their 
predecessors, these men carried with them the ideals of 
their social environment as they climbed the promotion 
ladder.  By the end of the decade the Army would publicly 
oppose the corruption of party politics, and the collusion 
between the parties and the large economic zaibatsu. 
Military participation in civil and social affairs reached a 
point unimaginable to Yamagata a few short years before. 
In the years following the establishment of the modern 
Army, Japanese military philosophy took a direction unique 
from European models.  Planning, and training did not focus 
on guns, formations, or logistics, but was directed at 
cultivating the martial spirit.  Building upon the heritage 
of Bushido, the Army leadership, perhaps realizing their 
disadvantage in the face of Western technology, promoted the 
149Spector, Ronald H., Eaale Against the Sun. (New York: The 
Free Press, 1985) pp. 33-34. 
150Storry, pp. 42-43. 
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idea that a soldier possessing only mediocre weapons but 
motivated by reverence for the Emperor could defeat the 
uninspired soldiers of the West.152  From the first day of 
induction into the conscription army until their last days 
in the reserves, the Japanese male population was 
indoctrinated into the beliefs of the Bushido code, and the 
Imperial Way.153 
Care was taken to guide and protect the minds of the 
soldiers, keeping them pure and reverential towards the 
Emperor.154 For officers this process began at the age of 
twelve when they entered one of several service academies 
after passing a competitive examination.155 For nearly six 
years they trained, drilled, and studied the art of war from 
a Bushido perspective.  Like the enlisted men, these young 
officer candidates were encouraged to meditate on the themes 
of the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors.156 The Rescript 
served to transmit the values of the Samurai (loyalty, 
courage, frugality, etc..) throughout the army.  It became 
holy writ, and inspired Japanese soldiers to follow the 
orders of their superiors, who acted in the name of the 
Emperor, with almost religious devotion.  In battle, the 
soldiers were promised, they would be guided by the same 
Shinto kami that had always watched over the land of the 
gods.  The Army never rehearsed the correct way to withdraw 
from an engagement, retreat would be too demoralizing.157 
Foreign observers reported Japanese soldiers dying in droves 
during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), and the Russo- 
152Grew, p. 14. 
153Huntington,  p. 128. 
154Lory, p. 71. 
155Spector, p. 34. 
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Japanese War (1904-05).  They were convinced that their 
spirits would be transported to the Yasukuni-jinja   (shrine) 
in Tokyo, where they would be honored by the Emperor himself 
in prayer.158 The weight of death in the Emperor's service 
was considered to be "lighter than a feather." 
The politics of the nineteen twenties had little 
sympathy for notions of honor or for the military's 
traditional role in Japanese society.  Retrenchment 
policies, which manifested themselves in cutbacks in the 
size of the military, and the disarmament treaties of 
Foreign Minister Shidehara were interpreted as direct 
threats to the Emperor's "Sovereign Power."  The gap widened 
between the politicians and the militarists, and the 
separation became complete in the disastrous years of the 
late twenties and early thirties when the Great Depression 
hit Japan with its full force. 
People in the agrarian regions, still facing high taxes, 
demonstrated time again against the liberal excesses of the 
government.  Leaders of the large zaibatsu were assassinated 
in the streets, blamed for disparate levels of wealth and 
poverty in Japan.159 Facing starvation in many cases, 
Japan's desperate population searched for succor from any 
source.  As one Japanese observed, 
As for a dictatorship, the Japanese people for 
centuries were under the benevolent rule of a 
Tokugawa; and some elements might not be so 
averse, as some would believe, to exchanging the 
present economic thraldom, with its deceiving 
facade of freedom, for an out and out political 
subservience provided it was accompanied by some 
surcease from the grinding heal of poverty.160 
Within the Army, two competing factions emerged to answer 
the desperate pleas of the people. 
159Noss, David S., and John B., p. 343. 
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The first of these two groups, the Tosei-ha,   or Control 
Faction, was composed of officers of moderate outlooks. 
Although it did seek a larger role for the military in 
Japanese government, this faction sought to solve Japan's 
economic and governmental problems by making use of the 
system at hand, altering it to suit their purposes.  Relief 
from the pangs of poverty would be found in an increased 
commitment to the capitalistic system, industrial expansion 
at home (under careful government supervision), and through 
the acquisition of materials and markets in China.  While 
the Tosei-ha was willing to acquire these goals through 
diplomacy, the other faction, the Kodo-ha   (Imperial Way 
Faction) was not.161 
For most of the young officers that composed the Kodo- 
ha, the struggle for power represented an all to real 
struggle for survival.  These officers were, by and large, 
the sons of the agrarian and working class people who were 
hardest hit by the depression.  True to their conservative 
heritage, Kodo-ha's membership opposed the labor strikes and 
other outward expressions of Western liberalism while 
simultaneously expressing a Confucian based loyalty with 
those suffering from economic shortfalls.162 Many officers 
would share their own small earnings with their men,163 while 
others deserted their posts to travel home to share the 
economic hardships of their parents.164 
Domestically this faction sought nothing less than a 
revolutionary overthrow of the present form of government. 
Convinced that corrupt government and business officials 
were preventing the Emperor from speaking with his true 
voice, the officers called for a "Showa Restoration" to 
161Lory, pp. 179-180. 
162Spector,   p.   34. 
163Lory,   p.   91. 
164Harries,   Meirion and Susie,   p.   178. 
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complete the revolution that had begun in 1868.  Once this 
task was accomplished, the Kodo-ha felt, the Emperor would 
be free to ease the economic suffering of his people, and 
then could move on to benefit the rest of the world through 
his divine leadership.165 The spread of the Imperial Way in 
Asia served as the idealistic base of the Kodo-ha's foreign 
policy.  Drawing upon the Shinto beliefs that had been 
instilled in them since young age in the village schools, 
the young officers felt that Japan had a special mission in 
Asia.166 
The center of this phenomenal world is the 
Mikado's [Emperor's] land.  From this center we 
must expand this Great Spirit throughout the 
world....The expansion of Great Japan throughout 
the world and the elevation of the entire world 
into the land of the Gods is the urgent business 
of the present and, again, it is our eternal and 
unchanging obj ect.167 
Increasingly the Kodo-ha looked towards the Asian 
mainland as the answer to Japan's economic distress.  The 
annexation of Korea had brought new resources and markets 
into the Japanese economy in 1911, and the Kodo-ha believed 
that the rich resources of Soviet Siberia, or China's 
Manchuria would more than make up for the setbacks of the 
Depression.  Driven by a messianic vision of a united Asia 
under Imperial rule, the Kodo-ha pressed for the 
establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
to be established by force if necessary.168 For the Kodo-ha, 
"whatever promotes the rule of the Emperor is right. 
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Whatever thwarts or hinders the extension of this rule is 
wrong. "169 
Of course the greatest restriction to Japanese expansion 
was the opposition of the West.  The Imperial powers of 
Europe combined with the United States to oppose Japan. 
This presented no problem for the inspired young officers. 
Japan, the victor over white Russia, would lead Asia out of 
bondage, dividing the world between the Anglo-Saxons, the 
Soviets, and themselves.170 If the Europeans and Americans 
would not voluntarily acknowledge the greater innate virtues 
of the Japanese Emperor and his people, then they would be 
overcome.  The Asians caught in the middle would, of course, 
be grateful to their liberators.171 
These two factions, by and large, represented a growing 
part of the public debate in Japan.  This debate reflected a 
dichotomy within the Japanese psyche expressing conflicting 
pulls towards independent growth, and military expansion; a 
divisive gap between a pragmatic view of Japanese 
nationalism, and an idealistic belief in a pseudo-religious, 
"chosen" position in the family of man.  For many of the 
Japanese, the outcome of the debate was never in doubt. 
Japan's national outlook is clearly expressed in the 
reminisces of one visitor to Japan during the early nineteen 
thirties. 
Soon after my arrival in Japan I had an 
interesting talk with a professor in one of the 
leading Tokyo universities.  He remarked that, as 
the people of North China are of the same racial 
stock as the majority of the inhabitants of 
Manchukuo [Manchuria], it would only be natural 
if, in time, these two territories should come 
under the same [Japanese] sovereignty. 
Then, he suggested, would come the turn of vast, 
sparsely populated Outer Mongolia. 
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This professor characterized himself as a "sane 
liberal. "172 
D.  JAPANESE MILITARISM IN BLOOM 
By nineteen thirty one, the world wide depression had 
been two years in existence.  Governments everywhere were 
searching for ways to decrease their spending, reduce the 
tax burden, and find jobs for their unemployed labor force. 
To facilitate this undertaking, United States' President 
Herbert Hoover suggested convening a Worldwide Disarmament 
Conference to cut the world's war-making potential by 
half.173 
For the factions within the Japanese military this 
conference presented an all to real threat to their power. 
Previously they had been forced to standby and watch as 
Japanese participation in international disarmament 
conferences resulted in cuts in the size and capabilities of 
the Army and the Navy.  Increasingly transfixed by the 
looming threat of the growing Soviet potential to their 
north, and the inviting lure of Manchuria's rich mineral 
resources to their west, both of the Imperial Army's leading 
factions quietly leaked that any consideration of further 
reductions in the nation's war-making potential would be an 
unacceptable intrusion on the Emperor's sovereign right of 
national defense.  While this did momentarily block the 
disarmament initiative, the military knew that it would have 
to act overtly if it was to seize control of the nation's 
foreign policy agenda.  Both of the factions, the Tosei-ha 
and Kodo-ha, chose a course of action which reflected their 
basic beliefs.  The evolution of militarism in Japan was 
reaching its climax in Japan, and it was running out of 
choices. 
The leader of the Tosei-ha faction, General Ugaki 
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Kazushige had been a prominent player in cabinet politics 
throughout the nineteen twenties, serving several times as 
War Minister.174 As the liberal challenge to the military's 
power in Japanese politics began to mount, Ugaki, ignoring 
the traditional warning against military involvement in 
political matters, led the Tosei-ha in its active reach for 
political power.  Interpreting the 1885 Rescript's command 
to defend the nation as having a higher priority than 
political abstinence, Ugaki justified his ambition as being 
necessary for the national defense. 
The death of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, who had 
never fully recovered from an assassin's attack the previous 
year, in nineteen thirty one created a power vacuum in the 
turbulent political storm of Depression Japan.  Conservative 
interests, including the Army, promoted Ugaki's name as a 
possible successor to the premiership, but liberal elements, 
including the last remaining Genro, Prince Saionji, blocked 
his nomination.175 The Army, however, was not willing to let 
the matter drop.  Weapons were stockpiled and an "incident" 
at the Diet was planned which would necessitate the calling 
up of the Army to restore order.  It would be an attempt to 
place Ugaki and the Tosei-ha in power through a coup.  This 
plan came to nothing largely because Ugaki wished to succeed 
to power through the use of the Constitutional system.176 
The Kodo-ha, with its strong belief in the mystical 
"Imperial Way" had no compunctions against working outside 
of the established system to achieve their aims.  Their 
goals were centered in the expansion of the Japanese Empire 
through the acquisition of territory on the Asian mainland, 
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specifically in Chinese Manchuria.  To accomplish these 
aims, the leaders of the Kodo-ha chose to deliberately 
attack the current system of government, undermining it 
through the use of overt public influence, well executed 
"incidents," and skill use of the ambiguous, independent 
diplomatic role afforded the Japanese military under the 
Imperial Commander in Chief clause of the Meiji 
Constitution.  Aware of the implicit threat of disarmament, 
the Kodo-ha sought to create an "incident" in China which 
could serve to heighten public support for expansion onto 
the Asian mainland.  It would not be the first time that the 
Kwantung Army, a Japanese force rife with young, hot-headed 
Kodo-ha supporters posted to Manchuria ostensibly to protect 
the south Manchurian railway zone, had acted upon its own 
"diplomatic" initiative.177 
During the mid nineteen twenties the Japanese had backed 
the Chinese Warlord Chang Tso-lin in an effort to offset the 
growing Russian influence in China, and to maintain the 
fractured power structure on the continent that had so 
greatly benefited Japanese strategists in the past. 
However, Chang Tso-lin became ambitious and sought to expand 
his power beyond the Manchurian region that had been his 
center.  He had conceived ideas of a new Imperial dynasty in 
China, with himself as its founder.178 Defeat greeted his 
ambition, and he was soon forced to retreat back to his lair 
in Manchuria.  As his train passed Mukden on June 4, 1928 
the "Old Marshall,"  who had once been counted as a Japanese 
ally until he became too unmanageable, was killed by a bomb 
conveniently thrown into his compartment.179 The Kwantung 
Army quickly blamed the "incident" on bandits, and pressed 
for expanded police powers in the region.  Back home in 
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Japan, realizing the identity of the "bandits," the 
government quickly halted any movements towards expansion, 
and buried the situation lest any foreign power learn of 
Japanese complicity in the crime.  While the first Kodo-ha-- 
Kwantung attempt at initiating Japanese military action in 
Asia did fail, it eventually led to the fall of a cabinet at 
home, further weakening democracy's hold on Japanese 
politics.180 Lessons were being learned. 
In the spring of 1931 word began to circulate around the 
Japanese capital of an impending incident in Manchuria of 
great importance.181 Inactivity on the part of the Japanese 
forces in China had led to a relative decline in its 
prestige on the continent, and the Chinese warlords, under 
the leadership of the Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek were 
patching up their political differences to present a united 
front.  Earlier the Chinese had captured a Japanese spy 
posing as an agricultural agent, and had shot him.  The 
challenge to the Japanese position was building, and the 
Kwantung Army was not planning to let the politicians in 
Tokyo handle it. 
Word of their plans reached the cabinet, and then the 
Emperor himself was informed.  Commanded to appear before 
the Throne, the War Minister, General Minami Jiro, was 
informed personally by the Emperor to command the Kwantung 
Army to "proceed with caution."  General Minami, a member of 
the Kodo-ha, sent the orders via Major-General Tatekawa 
Yoshitsugu, another diehard radical who proceeded to 
Manchuria via a slow boat, even though other, quicker 
transportation was available.182 Upon his arrival, he 
dallied at a local restaurant, falling into a drunken stupor 
and sleeping through the opening moments of the Manchurian 
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campaign.  Later he would explain the failure of his mission 
by stating, "I didn't make it on time."183 
The "incident" that started the campaign was almost a 
comedy of errors.  The Kwantung Army, nominally the 
protectors of the South Manchurian Railroad, set out to blow 
up a section of the track, derail a train, and then use the 
incident to attack Chinese forces in the area.  While the 
explosion did go off, the train proceeded over the damaged 
section of track without incident.184 Undeterred by the lack 
of an accident, the Kwantung Army attacked the Chinese 
forces in the area under the command of Chang Hsueh-liang, 
the son of the "Old Marshall," Chang Tso-lin.  Ordered by 
Chiang Kai-shek, who was depending upon the power of the 
League of Nations to aid him, not to resist Japanese 
aggression, Chang Hsueh-liang retreated as the Kwantung, 
acting in the name of "self defense, soon conquered most of 
Manchuria.185 
The Japanese government, facing a fait accompli, was 
forced to accept the Army's explanation of Chinese 
aggression, and the Japanese people, believing that the 
conquest of Manchuria would provide economic relief and 
great glory for the Emperor were enthusiastic in their 
approval of the action.  The radical elements of the Army 
had successfully exploited the independent nature of their 
relationship to the Emperor to carve out an expansionist 
foreign policy that was counter to the civil government. 
Their strong support from the working class, built by years 
of patient infiltration into the village and town social 
structure, coupled with the decades-long Shinto 
indoctrination within the school system provided the 
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expansion movement with an almost messianic air.  However, 
not all nations regarded the Japanese as the saviors of the 
Asian continent. 
The Chinese nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, for his 
part placed his faith in the international community to 
remove the Japanese presence in Manchuria.  Asking for 
assistance, Chiang was pleased when the League of Nations, 
Woodrow Wilson's great dream, dispatched a commission under 
the leadership of Lord Victor Alexander Lytton to 
investigate the matter.186 Attempting to distract the 
Western powers long enough for the Kwantung to consolidate 
its hold in Manchuria, the Japanese Army "came the 
assistance" of Japanese nationals in Shanghai who were being 
"mistreated" by Chinese citizens angry over the seizure of 
Manchuria.  The Lytton Commission was not distracted.  In 
1932 it issued a scathing report accusing Japan of "naked 
aggression" in violation of the 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact.197 
The people of Japan, at once sensitive to and contemptuous 
of outside judgement, reacted strongly against the 
diplomatic machinations that had previously taken away or 
downgraded Japan's military victories.188 Convinced of the 
righteousness of their cause (acting as the anti-Imperialist 
agent in Asia), and of the unfair nature of the League's 
charges, Japan withdrew from the body rather than face the 
censure of the international community. 
The party-led government attempted to reestablish some 
semblance of control over the nation's foreign policy, but 
soon it was in a struggle even to preserve its hold over the 
domestic scene.  Assassinations, a traditional tool of 
Japanese extremists, removed the moderate Prime Minister 
inukai, business leader such as Baron Dan Takuma of the 
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Mitsui zaibatsu, and Inoue Junnosoke, a former Finance 
Minister; cowering the remaining officials with the implicit 
threat of execution.189  In China attempts by senior 
commanders to establish control over the periphery were 
thwarted by young officers uneasy with peace, and desirous 
of a glorious death in the expansion of the Emperor's 
enlightened domain.  Reflecting the growth of acceptance for 
militarism, in each case of assassination or expansion the 
initial public shock and disdain was soon replaced by 
support once the perpetrator's "patriotic" intentions were 
made known.  Assassins served little to no time in jail, and 
the overzealous officers were not court martialed.190 To top 
it all off, in 1935 the conflict between the Tosei-ha and 
Kodo-ha factions within the army, previously hidden from 
public view, broke into the open in a power struggle for key 
positions on the General Staff. 
In the summer of 1935 the Tosei-ha, in an effort to 
block Kodo-ha influence, reassigned or retired a number of 
officers on the Imperial General Staff.  A member of the 
Kodo-ha, Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa, confronted the officer 
responsible, Lieutenant General Nagata, the Director of the 
Military Affairs Bureau, and demanded, on patriotic grounds, 
that it was his duty to reassign the officers to their old 
positions. When the General demurred, Aizawa shot and 
killed him.191 
The Minister of War, General Hayashi, facing accusations 
that the Army lacked disciplinary control of its officers, 
resigned his seat.  Nagata's assassination aggravated 
tensions that had long been present both within the cabinet 
and the Diet.  In January of 1936 the Diet dissolved and the 
subsequent election delivered a strong blow to the 
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nationalist extremists by decreasing their representation in 
the assembly.  High inflation, the strain of continuous 
growth in military spending, and the fanatical behavior of 
the extremists had cooled the public affection for the 
military.192 
Radicals are seldom deterred by democratic mandates, and 
the Kodo-ha were no exception.  The election of 1936 served 
to prove to the members of the Kodo-ha that the corrupting 
influences of the liberal West had spread farther than they 
had thought, and that immediate action was required to 
preserve the sanctity of the "Land of the Gods."  "The 
Emperor's voice must be heard" they declared.  Those liberal 
elements that had surrounded the Emperor, badly advising 
him, and blocking his voice from the people, must be removed 
to facilitate his return to direct rule, and the expansion 
of that rule across Asia.193 
In a significant break from past tradition, the death of 
Nagata signified that senior military officers were now 
classified among those "badly" advising the Emperor. 
Previously the members of the military chain of command were 
considered to speak with the Emperor's voice when issuing 
orders to juniors.  The radicals of the Kodo-ha brought a 
new interpretation to the old tradition.  If an officer was 
convinced that his superior misinterpreted "the true 
Imperial will" (of course, correctly interpreted by the 
Kodo-ha member), then disobedience to the senior's orders is 
not only justified, but necessary.194 
On the morning of February 26, 1936 several groups of 
young officers and their men fanned out across Tokyo, and 
other key centers of Japan. Their goal, drawing upon the 
example of the Forty-Seven Ronin, was to assassinate key • 
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officials who were blocking expansionists policies, and then 
deliver themselves to the Emperor.  Within hours the Finance 
Minister, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the 77 year old 
Privy Councilor Admiral Saito Makoto, and the Inspector 
General of Military Education were dead.  The Imperial Grand 
Chamberlain was seriously wounded, and the Prime Minister 
himself escaped death only because the rebels, in a case of 
mistaken identity, shot his brother-in-law.195 Appealing to 
the patriotic senses of the population, the mutineers 
released a "Great Purpose Manifesto."  It said, in part, 
in recent years...there have appeared many 
persons whose chief aim and purpose have been to 
amass personal material wealth, disregarding the 
general welfare and prosperity of the Japanese 
population, with the result that the sovereignty 
of the Emperor has been greatly violated.  The 
people of Japan have suffered deeply as a result 
of this tendency, and many troublous issues now 
confronting Japan are attributable to this fact. 
The Genro, senior statesmen, military cliques, 
plutocrats, bureaucrats, and political parties are 
all traitors who are destroying the national 
polity.  They infringed on the Imperial right of 
Supreme Command The Imperial work will fail 
unless we take proper steps to safeguard the 
Fatherland by killing all those responsible for 
impeding the Showa Restoration.196 
The "Manifesto" itself was carried to the Emperor by the 
war Minister.197 Never had the Imperial wrath been so 
evident.  Hirohito, angry at the deaths of his councilors, 
and at the presumption of the rebel officers in announcing 
his "true" Imperial will, refused to acknowledge or meet any 
of the demands of the rebels.  He ordered the army to put 
the mutiny down, and when the army delayed in the execution 
of his order the Emperor announced his intention to lead the 
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loyal Imperial forces himself.198  Slowly, as the Imperial 
intentions became known, the enlisted men within the revolt 
trickled away and returned to their barracks.  Eighty-one 
hours after it had began the revolt ended.  The Kodo-ha 
officers never got the opportunity to make their appeals to 
public patriotism in an open trial.  instead they faced a 
closed court martial proceedings, and a quick death.199 
From many perspectives the February 26, 1936 uprising 
would represent the defeat of militarist forces in Japan, 
but in the long run it signified a return to real military 
rule in Modern Japan.  While the influence of the Kodo-ha 
was broken (they would never exert influence on policy 
again) the Tosei-ha's influence increased.  Promoting the 
impression that it alone had saved the Emperor from revolt, 
the Control faction regained Imperial sanction for the rule 
that only active duty, three and four star officers could be 
appointed to the War and Navy Minster Portfolios.200 This 
gave the military approval power over cabinet appointments 
and the government policy.  By the end of nineteen thirty 
seven, the political parties had lost much of their 
influence over the cabinet, and national policy.  The Diet 
would remain, but it reverted to the impotent state that had 
marked its activities during the late nineteenth century and 
the first decade of the twentieth. 
The Kodo-ha did enjoy one victory. Tosei-ha strategic 
planners adopted the Kodo-ha's expansion doctrine into Asia 
as its own, and began to more actively promote military 
conquest.201 The hold of the messianic Imperial Way 
doctrine, and its offshoot the Co-Prosperity Sphere, was 
strong amongst the working people of Japan, and the Generals 
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of the Tosei-ha had to pay some respect to the masses. 
In the outlying areas the informal organizations like 
the Reservist Association, the expansionist Black Dragon 
society, and the Cherry Blossom society agitated for the 
"expansion of Imperial peace" throughout Asia.202 The 
pressures of a swelling population, high unemployment, 
inflation, and social discontent fueled the dreams of many 
in the rural communities to find prosperity elsewhere. 
Acquisition of new territory would benefit all parties 
involved; providing the Japanese with new room for growth, 
and the indigenous populations with a "superior" form of 
government.  As one rural leader would say, 
The rational distribution of territory, national 
resources, and population--this should be the 
keynote of international peace.  The establishment 
of world peace is Japan's aim.  No country in the 
world has so high a mission as Japan to save the 
world.203 
Tosei-ha leaders quickly moved to shore up their relations 
with these nationalist groups in the months that followed 
the Kodo-ha's defeat and disgrace.  Pronouncing agreement 
with the group's expansionist goals, the Tosei-ha supported 
the expansion of Shinto-based education programs in the 
nations' schools and universities, buying time to shore up 
their control of the government, and the strength of the 
wartime economy. 
Within government the influential Tosei-ha War Minister 
exerted a strong influence over the cabinet of Prime 
Minister Hirota Koki, which had been formed in March of 
1936.  Covering its steps with calls for reform, the Army, 
through continuous threats of resignation of its War 
Minister, pushed through a series of proposals which 
effectively streamlined the industrial, administrative and 
political structures; centralizing power in the national 
202Storry, pp. 165-169 
203Gunther, p. 51. 
88 
government.  A five year economic plan was drafted by the 
Army's mobilization planners, and submitted to the cabinet 
for approval.  Liberal elements within the government were 
aghast at the Army's blatant bid for power, but there was 
very little they could do.  The Tosei-ha leaders headed off 
liberal attempts to derail their plans by publicly 
questioning the government's patriotism, and privately 
expressing fears of another February 26 incident if power 
was not centralized.  When the cabinet called the Army's 
bluff, the enraged War Minister resigned, and no replacement 
stepped forward.  The cabinet folded.204 
The next cabinet, headed by Prince Konoye, pointedly 
excluded all party participation, and was more accommodating 
to the Army's wishes.  Passing a five year plan which placed 
the highest priority on Japan's military strength, the 
government considered all of its policies from the 
standpoint of their contribution to the nation's defense. 
The government exerted its control over credit, extending 
financial aide only to those industrial sectors deemed 
strategic.  Support for the military's plans grew with the 
expanding mobilization economy in Japan.  As the nation 
became more involved in preparedness, those industries 
favored by the militarists stepped up their production. 
Steel, chemical, machine tool industries all expanded.205 
People who had faced economic hardships for nearly eight 
years now had money in their pockets.  Support for the new 
government policies grew.  Later the early profits of 
expansion would be offset by the increased costs of imported 
raw resources that were necessary for the nation's survival. 
The rising trade deficit led to rising red ink in Japan's 
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budgets, and increased taxes for the Japanese people.206 
Coupled with the patriotic and religious support for 
expansion, it was not difficult to convince the public of 
the further need for expansion and conquest to gain access 
to the vital raw materials needed to guarantee the nation's 
autonomy in an increasingly hostile world. 
Political dissent was forbidden.  Public education, the 
mass media, and government pronouncements all issued 
coordinated statements pronouncing the frivolity of the 
West, and Japan's destiny in Asia.  Secret police 
scrutinized the population, jailing anyone who spoke out 
against the military.207 By the elections of 1937, Army 
control of the political process had reached a point where 
they were able to order all political candidates to ignore 
Japan's overseas activities, to refrain from mentioning any 
factional fights within the Army, or insinuate that the Army 
was a political organization.208 
On the night of July 7, 1937 a firefight broke out 
between Japanese forces stationed near the Marco Polo Bridge 
and the local Chinese.209 Some in Japan resisted the impulse 
to become involved in a land war on the Asian continent 
before the five year plan had the opportunity to take 
effect.  Others, heeding the popular call for a new order in 
Asia, saw an opportunity to quickly destroy the growing 
Nationalist Chinese influence in China, establishing a 
Japanese hegemony on the continent sooner rather than later. 
Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist leader, made a 
tactical decision to trade ground for time, and settled in 
for a long war.210 Japan would be in nearly continuous 
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conflict for the next eight years. 
In the months and years following the February 26, 1936 
rebellion the increasingly political leaders of the Tosei-ha 
followed the popular opinion favoring expansion, but they 
asked for something in return.  They demanded, using 
Yamagata's and Tanaka's words, National Unity.  Promoting 
and expanding upon the Shinto-based conservatism of the 
villages, the Generals organized the nation's populace along 
hierarchical lines.  Cabinet maneuvering allowed them to 
gain access and control of the allocation of economic 
resources.  Their status as direct subordinates of the 
Emperor allowed them to hold the very stability of the 
ruling government for ransom, and they received increased 
central control of the nation's administrative apparatus as 
their payoff.  Their actions were defined as "militarism," 
but they were in fact something greater; a national 




VI.  A TRANSITIONAL VERDICT ON JAPANESE MILITARISM 
By the summer of 1945 the Allied Powers of the United 
States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union had 
defeated Nazi Germany on the plains of Europe, and was 
gearing up to attack Japan.  Prior to the planned operations 
against the Japanese home islands the leaders of the United 
States, Great Britain and China gathered in Potsdam to 
discuss strategy.  At the conclusion of their discussions 
they united to issue a proclamation calling upon the 
Japanese to surrender unconditionally,-or face total 
destruction.211 Japan, suffering under the stinging blows of 
nearly three years in retreat was still proud, but even that 
pride gave way under the force of the atomic bomb. 
On August 14, 1945 the citizens of Japan gathered around 
their radios to hear something they had never before 
experienced, the voice of their Emperor.  Already bowed by 
the pressures of war, the people anticipated a call for the 
hand to hand defense of their islands in the face of certain 
invasion by Allied forces.  Instead they received another 
message that will always resonate in Japan. 
To Our good and loyal subjects: 
After pondering deeply the general trends of the 
world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our 
Empire today, We have decided to effect a 
settlement of the present situation....Despite the 
best that has been done by everyone... the war 
situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's 
advantage...the enemy has begun to employ a new 
and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do 
damage is indeed incalculable...Should We continue 
to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate 
collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, 
but also it would lead to the total extinction of 
human civilization...Let the entire nation 
continue as one family from generation to 
generation, ever firm in its faith of the 
imperishableness of its divine land...work with 
resolution so as ye may enhance the innate glory 
lSee Appendix C. 
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of the Imperial State and keep pace with the 
progress of the world.212 
The message was clear to the Japanese people.  The Emperor 
had not surrendered, he had not capitulated, but had instead 
effected a settlement.  His divine Majesty had ordered the 
war to end, not just for the good of Japan, but also for the 
good of all mankind.  The Japanese family survived, living 
within its divine land.  The nation's energy's would be 
focused in other directions, away from military expansion, 
seeking new ways to demonstrate the chosen nature of the 
Yamato race. 
Upon receiving the Potsdam Proclamation, military 
leaders had initially spoken out against proposals to end 
the war, while others in the Japanese government saw no 
other way out.  In the end the cabinet, deadlocked, called 
upon the Emperor for his advice, and it was his decision to 
surrender.  Unable to suffer the indignity of listening to 
his Emperor's speech, the War Minister, General Anami, slit 
open his belly and then punctured his juggler vein just 
hours before the broadcast.  Eighteen days later, on board 
the USS Missouri, Toshikazu Kase stared at the rows of 
Japanese flags that were affixed to the bulkhead of the 
great battleship and thought, "How did this happen?"  It was 
and is an excellent question. 
In this thesis I have sought to understand militarism in 
Japan during the years proceeding World War II.  The 
literature devoted to the subject of militarism illuminated 
a tendency towards broad definitions, derived generally from 
the German example, which showed little interest in the 
richness and complexity of the culture, events, and 
individuals that made the Japanese experience unique in 
world events.  By contrast, the discipline of historic 
analysis, a deep read of militarism's development in Japan, 
demonstrated great promise in defining the phenomenon. 
212
 See Appendix D for the entire Rescript, 
94 
Militarism in pre-World War II Japan was a product of 
Japan's culture, manifested within certain internal domestic 
organizations, and exacerbated by the encroaching pressures 
of foreign interests. 
Of these three contributing sources Japan's own 
traditional culture exerted the greatest and most defining 
influence.  Beginning with the clan-uji-units that existed 
before recorded history in the islands, a number of themes 
emerged which guides Japanese thought through the present 
day.  The most recognizable effect of the clan period was 
the development of the extended Japanese national family. 
Just as each individual in sixth century Japan knew his or 
her position in the complex, family-based, hierarchical 
structure that comprised the clan, so to did each Japanese 
in the third decade of this century recognize and 
acknowledge his or her position in the extended hierarchical 
structure of the Imperial state. 
The notion of the extended "Japanese" national family 
was strengthened by the continuing influence of Japan's 
native religion, Shinto.  Within the doctrines of Shinto all 
Japanese are descendants of a group of primal deities who 
created the Japanese islands thousands of years before.  As 
the living descendants of Amaterasu, the preeminent, life 
giving sun goddess, the Yamato clan established itself as 
the rulers and high priests of the islands.  Nearly a 
millennium and a half later the clan's leader, the Emperor 
Hirohito, reigned during World War Two as a reminder of the 
Yamato race's divine origin, and as a father figure for the 
greatly extended modern Japanese family. 
Other religions and philosophies left their mark upon 
militarism's development.  Confucian provided structure to 
the irregular, chaotic proceedings of the Japanese court. 
Later, the spread of Buddhism to the Japanese islands, with 
its emphasis on ceremony, distracted the imperial court and 
allowed the military Shogunates to gain influence.  Seeking 
to advance their own interests, the military governments at 
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Kamakura, Kyoto, and later Edo advanced the influence of Zen 
amongst the military class.  A hybrid of Chinese 
Confucianism and Buddhism, Zen evolved in Japan to 
incorporate and reflect the nation's own native Shinto 
beliefs.  This emerging philosophy contributed in its own 
way to the Bushido Code, which held little regard for life, 
valuing instead a stable social order, personal honor, 
loyalty, and sacrifice in the name of duty to one's 
superior. 
By most appearances Japan's governmental structure 
remained constant throughout the ages.  From the time the 
council of uji chiefs ceded authority to the Yamato leader 
until the end of World War Two, the Emperor remained the 
permanent source of power, civil and military.  Appearances, 
however, were only parts of reality. 
Within two hundred years of the establishment of the 
central Imperial government in Japan the Fujiwara family had 
conspired to rule the islands by Regency from "behind the 
curtain."  Later Shogunates extended this precedent, 
establishing dual lines of authority in the military 
capitals at Kamakura, Kyoto, and Edo.  By controlling taxes, 
court appointments, and other levers of influence, the 
military ruled as the de facto leaders of Japan until 1868 
while the Imperial institution atrophied under the weight of 
meaningless ceremonial duties. 
The revolutionary fervor of the Meiji Restoration 
destroyed many of the ineffectual social and governmental 
structures of Japan's feudal era, replacing them with 
efficient Western models which had been formed in the 
foundry's of the industrial revolution.  Ancient court 
councils and bloated military bureaucracies were replaced-by 
parliamentary cabinets, traditional clothing disappeared, 
samurai no longer wore their swords, and a new conscription 
army protect the young government.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century Japanese militarism had become, by all 
outward appearances, like its counterparts in the West, but, 
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despite its Western facade, in its heart it remained 
Japanese.  Nowhere was this fact more evident than in the 
Imperial Army. 
The leaders of the Imperial Army were more than willing 
to adapt superior Western uniforms, weapons, and tactics to 
their cause, and they were open to the advantages of an 
conscription army in the age of total mobilization, but they 
were also intent on maintaining the elemental Japanese 
characteristics of their organization and culture.  Rifle 
toting infantryman were encouraged to be practicing 
Shintoist; passionately believing in the superiority of his 
country, and the divinity of his Emperor.  Orders flowed 
within a chain of command shaped not by liberal notions of 
individual equality, but by the strict social regulation of 
Asian Confucianism.  Military leaders preserved the 
traditional dual nature of the Japanese government by 
subjugating the military, within the framework of the Meiji 
constitution, directly to the Emperor as opposed to the 
parliamentary cabinet.  In the end, the conscription army 
served as a conduit for the transmission of the Bushido Code 
of the samurai to the entire breadth and width of the 
nation, profoundly impacting its development. 
The undisciplined nature of democratic parliamentary 
politics, soon captured by financial interests, was 
increasingly perceived as contaminated.  Conversely the 
conscription army was perceived as a vehicle of social 
equality, allowing each individual Japanese male to carry a 
weapon in his nation's defense; a level of service 
previously reserved to samurai.  Military leaders anxious to 
establish "National Unity" borrowed from the structures of 
Western populist movements to establish auxiliary 
organizations in local communities to support the army, and 
promote the expansion of the Shintoist Imperial Way 
throughout Asia.  In time the military was able to portray 
itself as the pure protectors of the kokutai  or "national 
essence" of Japan. 
97 
The perceived threat to the "essence" came from the 
international system which had so rudely awakened Japan from 
its long sleep of isolation in 1854.  Imposing the treaty 
condition of extraterritoriality upon the less advanced 
Japanese, the Western powers unwittingly bruised the fierce 
pride of the "divine" Yamato race.  While the cries of 
"revere the Emperor-expel the barbarians" soon faded, 
replaced by "revere the Emperor-strengthen the nation," the 
Japanese never forgot the humiliation of the unequal 
treaties and worked constantly to gain acknowledgement of 
Japanese equality.  Treaty revision coincided with the 
Japan's first large scale military venture onto the Asian 
mainland, but many of the advances of that successful 
campaign were subsequently lost in diplomatic bargaining 
after the guns fell silent.  Japan entered the twentieth 
century convinced of the unfair nature of Western diplomacy 
and that international respect came only through aggression, 
the possession of land, and power. 
Ultimately it was the increased economic dependence on 
Western raw materials and Western consumers that hit Japan 
the hardest.  The devastating effects of the Great 
Depression only heightened Japan's distrust of the modern 
world.  Unemployment, hunger, and civil unrest aided those 
sectors of the national polity that promoted the policies of 
military expansion.  On the continent of Asia, they 
proclaimed, Japan would find all of the resources and buyers 
they needed to continue their progress independent of the 
corrupting influence of the West.  By expanding, they 
argued, Japan would be doing Asia's inhabitants a favor by 
ridding them of white Imperialists who had denied Japan its 
proper place in the world, and by bringing them the superior 
form of government encapsulated within the Imperial Way.  A 
strong national pride backed by the tenets of Shinto and the 
desperation that follows economic duress insured the success 
of the expansionist movement. 
Hence, by the commencement of hostilities on the Asian 
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continent, Japan's military had established a preeminent and 
leading role in Japanese society.  Cultural traditions 
established over centuries of feudal rule aided the 
militarists as they preserved their predominant role, first 
established in 1185, in the formulation of national policy, 
independent of the civil government.  Japanese society, 
coopted and indoctrinated by the conscription army and its 
auxiliary representatives in the rural villages, came to 
support the militarists in their effort to establish 
"National Unity."  Careful cultivation of the Shinto cult 
encouraged the populace to accept the military as true 
leaders of the nation, representing the pure characteristics 
of Japanese culture. 
Japanese militarism, as a political phenomenon, had at 
its base a purely Japanese, cultural foundation, and as such 
is distinct from similar occurrences elsewhere.  It is time 
to recognize that useful definitions are not found in broad 
concepts such as militarism (or a presumed Japanese variant 
thereof), but are found in the unique or specific case such 
as militaristic Japan, democratic Russia, or communist 
China.  The exploration of culturally based causal arguments 
demonstrate respect for the individuals, and nations that 
make up the human experience. 
The development of state sponsored Shinto in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries strengthened Japan's 
naturally strong ethnic identity.  Europe's highhanded 
diplomacy and the alien nature of Western civilization, 
despite its advancements in technology, encouraged a growing 
"insider-outsider" mentality within Japan that increasingly 
rejected participation in the Western diplomatic, and 
economic cabals which had conspired to deny Japan its true 
equal (or, to some, superior) position in the past,  in a 
very real sense Japan's pre-war militarism can be defined as 
the mobilization of the entire society, drawing upon the 
essentially homogeneous nature of that society, to achieve a 
position within the international system which reflected the 
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cultural perception of Japan's "chosen" status (derived from 
centuries of Shinto influence) within the family of man. 
That the "alien" international system was largely defined at 
the time in Imperial-colonial-military terms only served to 
buttress the martial segments within Japanese society in 
justifying the expansion of their influence. 
It is irresponsible to define Japanese militarism in 
broad terms when its true nature can only be understood 
within the context of the specific and unique properties of 
the local condition.  Too often academia has attempted to 
create an "elemental table" of the human condition. 
Suggestions that terms such as militarism, democracy, and 
liberty represent universal constants ignore the true 
"atoms" of society: individuals.  The interactivity of 
individuals form the molecules of life, the rules that they 
establish and follow, over time, become cultures which in 
turn combine together to form nations.  Attempts at 
universality have ignored the fact that cultures evolve in 
different regions, under widely differing environmental 
conditions, and arrive at different communal conclusions, 
and different ethnic aspirations.  By beginning to 
understand the development of militarism in Japan within the 
Japanese context, avoiding presumptuous applications of 
European concepts to other cultures, hastens the dawn of an 
understanding of the influence of militarism in Japan's 
future. 
What does this conclusion imply for Japan? Clearly it 
suggests that Japanese "militarism," rooted in the very 
"Japaneseness" of that society, could not be destroyed 
simply by taking away the nation's military capabilities. 
Although the cultural aspiration to acquire recognition of 
Japan's "chosen" position as a leader within the 
international system met with disaster during World war Two 
the cultural belief in Japan's "chosen" status survived. 
The Emperor's statement, "Let the entire nation continue as 
one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its 
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faith of the imperishableness of its divine land," charted 
the course for Japan's future.  Alternative venues, distinct 
from military power, offered Japan the opportunity to 
rebuild, exercise influence, and to gain recognition of its 
leadership. 
Japan's military emerged from the war completely 
discredited by the nation's defeat.  The post-war 
constitution institutionalized this disgrace by renouncing 
the Japanese nation's right of belligerency, and forbidding 
the formation of an offensive force.  Later, when the 
realities of the Cold-War forced a reconsideration of 
Japan's strategic role in North-East Asia, the newly created 
Self-Defense Forces were characterized by their purely 
defensive capabilities.  Additionally, fearing the 
reemergence of military interference in civil government, 
the Japanese leadership implemented safeguards which 
effectively silenced the voice of the Defense Forces at the 
Cabinet level. 
Instead, the prominent voices within the Japanese 
Cabinet rose from ministries focused upon economic policy. 
Their security guaranteed by a Treaty of Mutual Security and 
Cooperation with the United States, Japan's post-war leaders 
were free to pursue a special position in the world for 
their nation on the economic playing field.  Systematically 
rebuilding its infrastructure, followed by the expansion of 
its export sector, Japan, by the beginning of the nineteen 
eighties, possessed one of the world's largest economies, 
dominating electronics, auto, and shipbuilding industries 
among others.  Japan had garnered international respect and 
influence as an economic superpower. 
As the Cold War ended Japan began to advance an 
increasingly sophisticated form of foreign policy based upon 
its economic success.  Labeling its business first  approach 
'Comprehensive Security,' Japan pursued economic ties with 
its neighbors, and the rest of the world, while 
simultaneously promoting the idea that nations which trade 
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with each other are less likely to fight.  Despite 
criticisms of Japan's limited involvement in the 1991-92 
Persian Gulf War (generally depicted as "checkbook 
diplomacy") Japan has continued to pursue a role reflecting 
its chosen status in the family of man. 
Throughout the nineteen seventies and eighties, Japan 
characterized itself as the spokesman for Asia in Western 
dominated councils such as the G-Seven economic conference. 
Additionally Japan has sought a leading position in regional 
formats such as the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
meetings.  In perhaps the most telling example of Japan's 
vision of itself as a leader of nations, Japan's Prime 
Minister in 1993 hinted that his nation would be pleased to 
accept a seat as a permanent member (with veto power) on the 
prestigious Security Council of the United Nations.  In a 
show of growing confidence this hint was followed up in 1994 
by an outright announcement of Japan's qualifications, as a 
leading economic power, as the world's only constitutionally 
mandated pacifist nation, and as the only nation in the 
world to have actually experienced the horrors of a nuclear 
attack, for the prestigious seat. 
Reminders of militarist Japan still remain.  The force 
of hundreds of years of warrior rule emerge from time to 
time in seemingly random acts of ultra-nationalism and 
extremist-violence.  Many in Japan, including some Cabinet 
Ministers, have yet to openly acknowledge the atrocities 
committed by Japanese forces in World War II, but the 
recurrent difficulty in recruiting quality candidates for 
service in the Self Defense Forces, and the agonizing nature 
of the debate over enlarging the role of those forces reveal 
a deep seated suspicion of traditional militar activities. 
Japan has learned its lesson militarily.  It now 
realizes the inherent vulnerabilities of a nation isolated 
on the edge of the massive Asian continent, lacking even the 
most rudimentary raw materials to fuel its economy. 
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However, as its culture develops under the momentum of its 
own dynamism as well as its continued exposure to external 
ideas, Japan has heeded and will continue to follow, the 
Emperor's command to, "work with resolution so as ye may 
enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State" by pursuing 
the establishment and recognition of its "chosen" position 






IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ON EDUCATION 
Know Ye, Our Subjects: 
Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a 
basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly- 
implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and 
filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated 
the beauty thereof.  This is the glory of the fundamental 
character of Our Empire, and herein lies the source of Our 
education.  Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, 
affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and 
wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in 
modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; 
pursue learning and cultivate arts and thereby develop 
intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; 
furthermore, advance public good and promote common 
interests; always respect the Constitution and obey the 
laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously 
to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of 
Our imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.  So shall 
ye be not only Our good and faithful subjects but render 
illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. 
The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed 
by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by their 
descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and 
true for all places.  It is Our wish to lay it to heart in 
all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may 
all attain the same virtue. 




EMPEROR MEIJI'S IMPERIAL 
RESCRIPT TO SOLDIERS AND SAILORS 
The forces of Our Empire are in all ages under the 
command of the Emperor.  It is more than twenty-five 
centuries since the Emperor Jimmu, leading in person the 
soldiers of the Otomo and Minonobe' clans, subjugated the 
unruly tribes of the land and ascended the Imperial Throne 
to rule over the whole country.  During this period the 
military system has undergone frequent changes in accordance 
with those in the state of society.  In ancient times the 
rule was that the Emperor should take personal command of 
the forces; and although the military authority was 
sometimes delegated to the Empress or to the Prince 
Imperial, it was scarcely ever entrusted to a subject.  In 
the Middle Ages, when the civil and military institutions 
were framed after the Chinese model, the Six Guards were 
founded, the Right and Left Horse Bureaus established, and 
other organizations, such as that of the Coast Guards, 
created.  The military system was thus completed, but 
habituated to a prolonged state of peace, the Imperial Court 
gradually lost its administrative vigour; in course of time 
soldiers and farmers became distinct classes, and the early 
conscription system was replaced by an organization of 
volunteers, which finally produced the military class.  The 
military power passed over entirely to the leaders of this 
class; through disturbances in the Empire the political 
power also fell into their hands; and for about seven 
centuries the military families held sway.  Although these 
results followed from changes in the state of society and 
were deeply to be deplored, since they were contrary to the 
fundamental character of Our Empire and to the law of Our 
Imperial Ancestors.  Later on, in the eras of Kokwa and 
Kaei, the decline of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the new 
aspect of foreign relations even threatened to impair our 
national dignity, causing no small anxiety to Our August 
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Grandfather, the Emperor Ninko, and Our August Father, the 
Emperor Komei, a fact which We recall with awe and 
gratitude.  When in youth We succeeded to the Imperial 
Throne, the Shogun returned into Our hands the 
administrative power, and all the feudal lords their fiefs; 
thus, in a few years, Our entire realm was unified and the 
ancient regime restored.  Due as this was to the meritorious 
services of Our loyal officers and wise councilors, civil 
and military, and to the abiding influence of Our Ancestors' 
benevolence towards the people, yet it must also be 
attributed to Our subjects' true sense of loyalty and their 
conviction of the importance of "Great Righteousness."  In 
consideration of these things, being desirous of 
reconstructing Our military system and enhancing the glory 
of Our Empire, We have in the course of the last fifteen 
years established the present system of the Army and Navy. 
The supreme command of Our forces is in Our hands, and 
although We may entrust subordinate commands to Our 
subjects, yet the ultimate authority We Ourself shall hold 
and never delegate to any subject.  It is Our will that this 
principle be carefully handed down to posterity and that the 
Emperor always remain the supreme civil and military power, 
so that the disgrace of the middle and succeeding ages may 
never be repeated.  Soldiers and Sailors, We are your 
supreme Commander-in-Chief.  Our relations with you will be 
most intimate when We rely upon you as Our limbs and you 
look up to Us as your head. Whether We are able to guard 
the Empire, and so prove Ourself worthy of heaven's blessing 
and repay the benevolence of Our Ancestors depends upon the 
faithful discharge of your duties as soldiers and sailors. 
If the majesty and power of Our Empire be impaired, do you 
share with Us the sorrow; if the glory of Our arms shine 
resplendent, We will share with you the honour.  If you all 
do your duty, and being one with Us in spirit do your utmost 
for the protection of the State, Our people will long enjoy 
the blessings of peace, and the might and dignity of Our 
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Empire will shine in the world.  As   t     * 
you, soldiers and Sailors, We gxve you the followxng 
precepts:- consider loyalty 
/,N  ThP soldier and the sanoi bnuux^ ■    t,  who that is born in this land can be 
their essential duty, «ho t ^ ^ ^ soidier 
wantin3 in the spi t ^J^ e££iclent unless 
or sailor, especially, can he r .n 
this spirit ^.^^^u ordered and 
whom this spirit is not strong, than a 
disciplined it .ay be. is in an »= ^ ^ ^ ^ 
rabhle. -.e^er that - ^       the strength o£ its 
che maintenanc ' <* l£££   ^  strength must affect the 
arms, the growth or decline o        fh.rsfore neither be 
nation's destiny for good or for ^'J^™^   buC 
ied astray by cnrrent opinions nor meddle n P°* 
with single heart fulfil your essent a^^ ^ 
bear in mind that duty » "^tie^ ,y £aillng in moral 
—,„  Ä sold- an, bf -  -Id b^strict^ ^ 
observing propriety.  Soldiers 
grades, from the Marshal and the Admiral °* ^ ^ 
'to the private soldi« or °^°^ " ^f J^^ty 
the same ran* and grade there are ^"^'^ to their 
ZS*.  as issuing directly from U, «^ « --^ 
respect not only to your superiors but also to y 
^though not serving under them.  *> the^ther an , 
superiors shoulc^-rI« ^ ^rlUes them to be 
or arrogance.  Except wnen inferiors 
strict and severe, superiors should treat their 
with consideration, mating Xindness their chief arm 
,11 arades may unite in their service to the Emperor 
you.
3
Soldierand Sailors, neglect to observe propriety, 
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treating your superiors with disrespect and your inferiors 
with harshness, and thus cause harmonious co-operation to be 
lost, you will not only be a blight upon the forces but also 
be unpardonable offenders against the State. 
(3) The soldier and the sailor should esteem valour. 
Ever since the ancient times valour has in our country been 
held in high esteem, and without it Our subjects would be 
unworthy of their name.  How, then, may the soldier and the 
sailor, whose profession it is to confront the enemy in 
battle, forget even for one instant to be valiant?  But 
there is true valour and false.  To be incited by mere 
impetuosity to violent action cannot be called true valour. 
The soldier and the sailor should have sound discrimination 
of right and wrong, cultivate self-possession, and form 
their plans with deliberation.  Never to despise an inferior 
enemy or fear a superior, but to do one's duty as soldier or 
sailor--this is true valour.  Those who thus appreciate true 
valour should in their daily intercourse set gentleness 
first and aim to win the love and esteem of others.  If you 
affect valour and act with violence, the world will in the 
end detest you and look upon you as wild beasts.  Of this 
you should take heed. 
(4) The soldier and the sailor should highly value 
faithfulness and righteousness.  Faithfulness and 
righteousness are the ordinary duties of man, but the 
soldier and the sailor, in particular, cannot be without 
them and remain in the ranks even for a day.  Faithfulness 
implies the keeping of one's word, and righteousness the 
fulfillment of one's duty.  If then you wish to be faithful 
and righteous in anything, you must carefully consider at 
the outset whether you can accomplish it or not.  If you - 
thoughtlessly agree to do something that is vague in its 
nature and bind yourself to unwise obligations, and then try 
to prove yourself faithful and righteous, you may find 
yourself in great straights from which there is no escape. 
In such cases your regrets will be of no avail,  hence you 
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must first make sure whether the thing is righteous and 
reasonable or not.  If you are convinced that you cannot 
possibly keep your word and maintain righteousness, you had 
better abandon your engagement at once.  Ever since the 
ancient times there have been repeated instances of great 
men and heroes who, overwhelmed by misfortune, have perished 
and left a tarnished name to posterity, simply because in 
their effort to be faithful in small matters they failed to 
discern right and wrong with reference to fundamental 
principles, or because, losing sight of the true path of 
public duty, they kept faith in private relations.  You 
should, then, take serious warnings by these examples. 
(5)  The soldier and the sailor should make simplicity 
their aim.  If they do not make simplicity your aim, you 
will become effeminate and frivolous and acquire fondness 
for luxurious and extravagant ways; you will finally grow 
selfish and sordid and sink to the last degree of baseness, 
so that neither loyalty nor valour will avail to save you 
from the contempt of the world.  It is not too much to say 
that you will thus fall into a life-long misfortune.  If 
such an evil once makes its appearance among soldiers and 
sailors, it will certainly spread like an epidemic, and 
martial spirit and morale will instantly decline.  Although, 
being greatly concerned on this point, We lately issued this 
Disciplinary Regulations and warned you against this evil, 
nevertheless, being harassed with anxiety lest it should 
break out, We hereby reiterate Our warning.  Never do you, 
Soldiers and Sailors, make light of this injunction. 
These five articles should not be disregarded even for a 
moment by soldiers and sailors.  Now for putting them into 
practice, the all important is sincerity.  These five 
articles are the soul of Our soldiers and sailors, and 
sincerity is the soul of these articles.  If the heart be 
not sincere, words and deeds, however good, are all mere 
outward show can avail nothing.  If only the heart be 
sincere, anything can be accomplished. Moreover, these five 
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articles are the Grand Way of heaven and Earth and the 
universal law of humanity, easy to observe and to practice. 
If you, Soldiers and Sailors, in obedience to and to fulfil 
your duty of grateful service to the country, it will be a 
source of joy, not to Ourself alone, but to all people of 
Japan. 
The 4th day of the 1st month of the 15th Year of Meiji. 
(Imperial Sign Manual) 
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APPENDIX C 
PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS, 
UNITED STATES, CHINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(1) We, the President of the United States, the President 
of the National Government of the Republic of China and the 
Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds 
of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that 
Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. 
(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United 
States, the British Empire and of China, many times 
reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west are 
poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military 
power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all 
the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until 
she ceases to resist. 
(3) The result of the futile and senseless German 
resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the 
world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the 
people of Japan.  The might that now converges on Japan is 
measurably greater than that which, when applied to the 
resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the 
industry and the method of life of the whole German people. 
The full application of our military power, backed by our 
resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction 
of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the 
utter destruction of the Japanese homeland. 
(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will 
continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic 
advisors whose unintelligent calculations have wrought the 
Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether 
she will follow the path of reason. 
(5) Following are our terms.  We will not deviate from 
them.  There are no alternatives.  We shall brook no delay. 
(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and 
influence of those who have deceived and misled the people 
of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist 
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that a new order of peace, security and justice will be 
impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the 
world. 
(7) Until such a new order is established and until there 
is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is 
destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by 
the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of 
the basic objectives we are here setting forth. 
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out 
and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of 
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as 
we determine. 
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely 
disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with 
the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. 
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as 
a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be 
meted out to all war criminals, including those who have 
visited cruelty upon our prisoners.  The Japanese government 
shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening 
of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.  Freedom 
of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect 
for the fundamental human rights shall be established. 
(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as 
will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just 
reparations in kind, but not those industries which would 
enable her to re-arm for war.  To this end, access to, as 
distinguished from control of raw materials shall be 
permitted.  Eventually Japanese participation in world trade 
relations shall be permitted. 
(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn 
from Japan as soon as these objectives have been 
accomplished and there has bee established in accordance 
with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a 
peacefully inclined and responsible government. 
(13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now 
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the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, 
and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good 
faith in such action.  The alternative for Japan is prompt 
and utter destruction. 
Potsdam July 26, 1945 






THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT OF AUGUST 14, 1945 
To Our good and loyal subjects: 
After pondering deeply the general trends of the world 
and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We 
have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation 
by resorting to an extraordinary measure. 
We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the 
Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and 
the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of 
their Joint Declaration. 
To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all 
nations as well as the security and well being of Our 
subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down 
by Our Imperial Ancestors, and which We lay close to heart. 
Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our 
sincere desire to ensure Japan's self preservation and the 
stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought 
either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or 
to embark territorial aggrandizement.  But now the war has 
lasted for nearly four years.  Despite the best that has 
been done by everyone--the gallant fighting of military and 
naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of 
the State and the devoted service of Our one hundred million 
people, the war situation has developed not necessarily to 
Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world 
have all turned against her interest.  Moreover, the enemy 
has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of 
which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll 
of many innocent lives.  Should We continue to fight, it • 
would not only result in an ultimate collapse and 
obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead 
to the total extinction of human civilization.  Such being 
the case, how are We to save millions of Our subjects; or to 
atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial 
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Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the 
acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the 
Powers. 
We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our 
Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently- 
cooperated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East 
Asia.  The thought of those officers and men'as well as 
others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who 
died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely 
death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night 
and day.  The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, 
and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are 
the subjects of Our profound solicitude.  The hardships and 
sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter 
will be certainly great.  We are keenly aware of the inmost 
feelings of all ye, Our subjects.  However, it is according 
to the dictate of time and fate that We have resolved to 
pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to 
come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is 
insufferable. 
Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure 
of the imperial State, We are always with ye, Our good and 
loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. 
Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may 
engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention 
and strife which may create confusion, lead ye astray and 
cause ye to lose the confidence of the world.  Let the 
entire nation continue as one family from generation to 
generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness 
of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy" burden of 
responsibilities, and the long road before it.  Unite your 
total strength to be devoted to the construction for the 
future.  Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of 
spirit; and work with resolution so as ye may enhance the 
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innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the 
progress of the world. 
(Imperial Sign Manual) 
(Imperial Seal) 
The 14th day of the 8th month 
of the 2 0th year of Showa. 
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